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Abstract 
 
This work is researching the flow and the structure of the migration waves to Denmark 
within the period of the financial and economic crisis within the period 2008-2012. This 
is done with the use of statistical and theoretical data within a cross-temporal comparison 
methodological analytical framework. There will be an overview of the other European 
member-states that have been mostly affecting the crisis-driven migration to Denmark. 
Under migration is implemented mainly inner-European Union migration. There will be 
discussion over the Danish model of welfare and Denmark’s migration politics models. 
The discussion will be in terms of investigating, if these models favor migration or not 
and how they are affected by the changes into the migration flows and the European 
Union’s migration and anti-crisis measures policies. When it is researched if there is a 
relation between the European policies and the Danish policies, it is implemented in the 
meaning of the European Union’s measures against high unemployment rates in some 
regions and increased migration to other regions into the European Union area that are 
with better and stable economies even in a situation of a global recession. The major 
focus will be on the migration and the labor market and the role of the “push” and “pull” 
factors into the migration processes. More specifically in that what “pushes” the 
immigrants from certain areas to Denmark’s welfare structure, and how the crisis-driven 
migration into the period 2008-2012 affects the Danish welfare structure.  
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Problem statement 
 
To what extend the “push” and the “pull” factors of migration flows to Denmark are 
influenced by the financial and economic crisis into the period 2008-2012?  
 
1.2 Motivation 
 
There has been always inner-European migration from the East to the West and from the 
South to the North, as well as conversely, but the first case is most likely to be. But there 
has been the division between the North “immigrant receiving” countries and the South 
“immigrant sending countries”. The aim of this research is to investigate how this 
immigration flow has been affected after the financial and economic crisis and why the 
Danish welfare is “a magnet” for immigrants.  
 
The economic crisis itself costs shortages of jobs and opens doors for migration to 
countries with stronger economies and more stable labor market. One of these countries 
with open economies and welfare model system that is stable, even in a situation of 
“recession” is Denmark. During the crisis period the migration waves from the different 
regions has different dynamics that is determined by the motives for migration to one 
country with political and economic structure as Denmark. There are different “push” and 
“pull” factors that navigate the migration waves from one place to another. It is 
interesting and important for the Danish society to observe that processes on European 
level after the burst of the peak of “the recession” in 2008-2009.  
 
The Scandinavian model of welfare has its advantages and disadvantages but somehow it 
is still very attractive for people all over Europe and the rest of the world with the 
benefits that it secures. Part of the research will investigate which are the factors that 
provoke that migration. What are the Danish government policies in terms of migration 
and integration that makes Denmark “immigrant-welcome” country? Is there any change 
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of the immigrant waves to Denmark after the crisis and if they change somehow is it in 
direction of the European countries that are most affected from the crisis?  
 
1.3 Research questions 
 
1. What are the characteristics of the migration flows and the structure of the migration 
waves to Denmark?   
 
2. How does the unfolding financial and economic crisis impact on the net-migration 
flows to Denmark’s labor market in terms of the past experience and new trends of 
migration waves?  
 
3. What is the impact of the financial and economic crisis in addition to the labor 
market and management of the legislative framework (migration policies) in 
Denmark? 
 
1.4 Interpretation 
 
From one side the project is investigating the relation between the financial and economic 
crisis and how does it affects the changes into the structure of the migration waves to 
Denmark, and from other side the relation between the crisis-changed migration waves 
and the reaction of the Danish government in terms of a change into the immigration 
politics. The aim of that change could be the protection of the domestic labor market of 
being “overcrowded” from one side, and from other side the protection of the welfare 
itself. The “push” and “pull” factor theoretical framework is very good researching tool, 
because it allows systematizing of the factors that make a person to migrate from one 
destination to another and which are the factors that attract or “pull” an individual to 
migrate to certain destination.
1
 The crisis is also used as a tool to illustrate which are the 
factors that “push” an individual to migrate. One side of the coin is that the countries in 
                                               
1 Note: When there is a mentioning of the terms “push” or “pull” it refers to Lee’s “push and pull” factor 
theoretical model; Lee E.S. 1966 A Theory of Migration Demography Vol. 3. N 1 pp. 47-57  
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the periphery in general have weaker economies than the countries into the center inside 
the European Union and there are historical and politico-economical reasons for that. The 
crisis enforces the higher levels of unemployment and inflation in the countries with 
weaker economies. This is a factor itself for the people to migrate to a country with better 
economy and a country that is stable even in a situation of an economic recession. The 
other thing is that the welfare structure itself is very attractive and that what makes 
unique the Danish model of social - democratic welfare state is that this politico-
economical structure reminds stable even in a situation of a global recession. For this 
reason there are a lot of political and economical arguments. The countries most affected 
from the financial and economic crisis in Europe (the so called “PIGS- countries” – 
Portugal Ireland, Greece and Spain (Media used expression.)) are also countries with 
welfare structures. There is a politico-economical explanation why these welfare models 
are weaker and proved unstable during the global recession, but for the people in these 
countries the welfare magnet is not so strong motivation to immigrate to Denmark, 
because the cost of migration is not paying back. The reason for that is that the 
population in these countries has high levels of social security and that secures them 
against the crisis in a situation that they could be unemployed, for example, and these 
factors make it that is not paying back to take the risk of migration when it comes to find 
new jobs or search for better life conditions.    
 
The research questions in this project are based on the problem statement: to what extend 
the “push” and “pull” factors of migration flows to Denmark are influenced by the 
financial and economic crisis? They are showing concrete path-dependency that is 
relevant to be questioned during the whole research in order to come up with the 
conclusion hypothesis for it. The problem statement should be understood as how the 
“push” factors are strengthened by the crisis that “pushes” people to migrate. When 
people choose a country to migrate they are navigated from certain factors that make 
them feel attracted to certain destination more than other destinations. Part of the problem 
statement investigates which are the factors that “pull” people to migrate to certain areas 
with better conditions for work, or higher wages, or better political and economic 
stability (conditions). The project investigates as well what are the “pull” factors that 
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make Denmark attractive to immigrants from the countries that are most affected by the 
recession in the period 2008-2012. Another aspect of understanding the problem 
statement is its interdependency between the Danish legislative system and the migration 
flows to Denmark. The project will look into some legislative instruments that the Danish 
state uses to “pull” certain immigrants from certain areas and to redirect others to other 
destinations.  Another thing that is slightly implemented into the understanding of the 
following research is that the politics of Denmark in addition to handle all the erasing 
migration waves that are coming from crisis-affected countries are changing and this has 
an effect on the society and the political-economy system of the Danish welfare and 
changes “the welfare magnet”.2  
 
1.5 Scope/ Limitation 
 
The following research will include statistical data from the financial and economic crisis 
period between 2008 and 2012. This limits the opportunity to create a complete up to date 
account of the developments of the migration processes into 2013. The time limitation 
has been a necessity in order to be led a good research.  
 
The research has some limitations to it, as the choice of approach is narrow and analytical 
of the inner-European migration to Denmark that puts some limits of the research in 
terms of the increasing migration from countries outside Europe. That is done in terms of 
the focus over the “push” factors that are triggered from the crisis for a migration to 
Denmark, and the “pull” factors that make Denmark look more stable and secure in times 
of a crisis than other European welfare-structured states. In order to illustrate these 
processes and to illustrate if there is a connection between the crisis and the migration to 
Denmark there will be used a statistical data that will be analyzed in favor of the 
illustrated hypothesis. The data has also limited character that makes it troubled to follow 
the newest trends. Also there are theoretical limitations of the research that exclude other 
useful theoretical ideas from the focus of the research and limit it to the framework on the 
neoclassical macroeconomic migration theory, the magnet factors hypothesis, and the 
                                               
2 Note: here I am referring to the “welfare magnet factor” hypothesis of George Borjas (Borjas, 1999),  
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“push” and “pull” factors theory of migration. The research has more political-economic 
focus over the subject than socio-political one.   
 
There are limits of the  quantitative data, because of the time limits of the research there 
were not led interviews with immigrants from the crisis effected European areas as has 
been the primary idea that limits the investigation to the statistical and theoretical  based 
desk work and does not put so much focus on the social factor.  
 
There is, as well, a limitation of the variety of variables that has been chosen to be used in 
the project. That limits the boundaries of the research and puts straight focus on the 
research. That has been done, because of administrative requirements of the project 
timeline.   
 
2. Methodology 
 
2.1. Theories and Models Used 
 
The project will be divided into two theoretical and analytical parts: economical and 
political. Into the economical part will be included the Neoclassical migration theory and 
the push and pull factor theoretical model, as well as the overview of the recession and its 
influence on the migration flows and the effect over the labor market.  
 
In the political part will be included the discussion over the welfare magnet factor 
hypothesis and the three types of welfare models according to J. Andersen’s3 typology 
and the changes into the legislative system in terms of better control of the migration 
flows and limitation of the possibility of abuse of the welfare state benefits.    
 
2.2. Data collection  
 
                                               
3 Jørgen Goul  Andersen Restricting access to Social Protection for immigrants in the Danish Welfare State, 
The Policy Press 2007 
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The work is based on a ‘‘Desk research’’. The sources for it will be established on 
primary sources from  the International Organization of migration reports (World 
Migration Reports – 2008-2012) and  OECD-International Migration Outlook – 2008-
2012) the International Institute of Migration in Oxford; the Danish Immigration Service 
of the national statistic database for the state of Denmark, Migration Unit at the Danish 
Institute for International Studies, Eurostat, Eurobarometer, and secondary sources from 
different scientific articles and researches. The secondary sources are the main element in 
the research, together with journal articles and theory books providing the analytical tools 
to show the different perspectives on the topic. In order to analyze the migration flows 
and how that is effected from the crisis there will be provided data that will be analyzed 
along with the theoretical data base that is used into the research. 
 
2.3. Criticism of sources 
 
There is a use of mainly secondary sources that are derived from academic books, journal 
articles and on-line sources. Thereby they are considered to be sources for factual and 
scientifically relevant information. 
 
The weakness of the desk-based research method is the lack of ability to clarify and 
control the facts and data provided. One of the main critics of the following research will 
be that there is a timeline of the crisis period in 2008-2012, but the crisis is still in process 
and the newest information after the above mentioned timeline has been not taken into 
consideration. Another thing is that the welfare magnet is still a hypothesis and that might 
be a fragile argument into the defending of the project’s hypothesis. There is also a risk 
when there is only statistical data used as empirical evidence without being led interviews 
with focus groups and experts into the researched field. The focus only on statistical data 
might compromise the relevance of the analytical data results that will be presented. 
There should be berried in mind that when some of the statistical data have been 
collected there were not taken into a consideration all the groups and there is not a 
specific data presented that directly proves the relation between the recession and the 
increase for the number of immigrants coming from the most crisis-affected countries as 
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the “PIGS countries”. The data presents quite the opposite that might have some other 
theoretical or hypothetical explanation that has not an empirical proof. There is a lack of 
primary resources and the theoretical framework is quite narrow and focuses more on the 
economical factors than on the social and humanitarian factors that could be a reason for 
a person to migrate from one country to another.   
 
2.4. Structure 
 
 
3. Theories 
3.1. Neoclassical Macroeconomic Migration Theory 
 
One of the main authors that investigate the problematic field of the theories of migration 
and are taken into a consideration into the theoretical derives of the project is: Hein de 
Haas, Douglas Massey and Lucia Kurekova. There are several migration theories that are 
collaborated into the scientific field, when it comes to international migration that look 
the process of migration into different angles. These theoretical approaches are important 
to clarify the nature of migration, the factors that provoke people to migrate from one 
place to another and what could cost that migration. These theories also give an idea what 
Introduction Methodology 
Theories 
Neoclassical 
migration 
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“Push” and “pull” 
factor theory 
The Danish 
Welfare State 
and the Crisis 
Analysis 
Conclusion Empirical 
Data 
The Welfare Magnet 
Factor hypothesis 
Migration 
flows 
The Danish 
Welfare Model 
and the 
Immigration 
Policies 
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are the consequences from the migration processes on the territory of one state and how 
do they affect the society, the social structure and the political-economic system.  
 
In the case of the nature of the problem that it is investigated in this project, it is needed 
to be taken into account the neoclassical approach in order to analyze the factors that are 
cost by the financial and economical crisis and to discuss the economical motives for 
migration to a country politically and economically structured as Denmark.  This is the 
main theoretical framework that will trigger the ideological approach into the ongoing 
magister thesis project. 
 
The neoclassical model in its ideological base, how it is suggested from Lucia Kurekova, 
is build up on the assumption of full employment and suggests that there is a direct 
connection between the wage difference and the size of the migration flows.
4 
This could 
be the factor that attracts or “pulls” immigrants from some member-state countries with 
specific political-economy structures to countries with welfare structure as that one in 
Denmark, e.g. in terms of high wages and high living standards. In a situation of a crisis, 
or how it is called recently, “a recession”5, that seems to be a good “pull” factor for 
immigrant waves in a form of labor force to the Danish labor market.  
 
The neoclassical economics theory of migration “focuses on differentials in wages and 
employment conditions between countries, and on migration costs; it generally conceives 
of movement as an individual decision for income maximization. The “neo economics of 
migration, in contrast, considers conditions in a variety of markets, not just labor markets. 
It views migration as a household decision taken to minimize risks to family income or to 
overcome capital constraints on family production activities.”6  
 
The neoclassical theory is divided into macro and micro level.  The neoclassical macro 
theory explains migration that “is caused by geographic differences in the supply of and 
                                               
4 Kurekova, L. 2011, p. 20 Theories of migration: Conceptual review and empirical testing in the context of 
the EU East West flows. 
5 Note: Here I refer to an assumption that is selected by the European Commission. 
6
 Massey: 1993: p. 432 
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demand for labor.”7 According to the neoclassical macro theory the international 
migration of workers is caused by differences in wage rates between countries; the 
elimination of wage differentials, and labor markets are the primary mechanisms by 
which international flows of labor are induced; other kinds of markets do not have 
important effects on international migration; The way for governments to control 
migration flows is to regulate or influence labor markets in sending and/or receiving 
countries.
8
 The Neoclassical economics micro theory is a microeconomic model of 
individual choice.
9
 
 
The neoclassical theoretical approach is suitable to be used when the focus is on 
volunteer migration. The focus in this project is on inner-European migration that is only 
voluntary, because there is not a situation of a war or a natural disaster on the territory of 
the union. 
10
 
 
A branch of the same theoretical approach is the theory of the “push” and “pull” factors 
of migration. “The push-pull approach assumes that there exist factors which attract 
immigration (pull) and others that generate emigration (push). In a way, this theory 
isolates two aspects of the decision to migrate, with the decision to leave the home 
country being determined by push factors, and the choice of the destination country 
determined by pull factors”.11 
 
This theory is needed to be used in terms of examining the crisis as a “push” factor, or a 
reason for a migration, because of high levels of unemployment, higher level of 
economical and political insecurity, and higher levels of loosing trust into the local 
political, economical and financial institutions. There are many “push” and “pull” factors 
that are reasoning migration. The focus here will be only on some of those factors that are 
                                               
7 Massey 1993: p. 443 
8 Massey 1993: p. 434 
9 Massey, 1993, p. 435; referred to: Sjaastad, 1962; Todaro, 1969, 1976, 1989; Todaro and Maruszko, 1987 
10
 For a schematic overview of theories of immigration see Kurekova (2010, p 7; 2011, p.14 or appendix  1 
11 Note: As mentioned in the Review of DG EMPL of European Commission, separation of the push and 
pull factors is for analytical reasons. “In the real world, it may be hard to disentangle push and pull factors, 
as it is the comparison between the respective home and foreign variables that matters. (European 
Commission: DG EMPL. Laurent Aujean et al. 2011. p. 259) 
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in relevance for arguing of the purposes of the defining hypothesis of the “push” factors 
of the crisis and the “pull” factors of the Danish welfare system.  
 
The “push” and “pull” neoclassical theoretical framework is a part of other equilibrium 
models theories, which assume a universally proportional relationship between absolute 
levels of relative differences of wealth and migration.
12
 This theoretical framework 
assumes as presented from de Haas that the higher levels of economic and human 
development are associated to higher overall levels of migration and as the neoclassical 
equilibrating models assumes a U-curve effect on emigration. According to the same 
source the demographic factors has no direct effect on migration.
13
 The equilibrium 
model theories are based on the macroeconomic neoclassical theory that is a supply-
derived economic approach. The neoclassical economic theory beliefs in the construction 
of a “perfect world” where the market-forces rule and the market adjusts itself. It is 
related to the idea of the famous economist Adam Smith and “the invisible hand” of the 
market
14
. The model is graphically represented through a scheme between demand and 
supply that are crossing into an equilibrating point of perfect competition, full 
employment and balanced economic system. (See the graph in fig. 1).This model is too 
idealistic and has nothing to do with reality in economists’ meaning. Contradiction of this 
theory is the Keynesian perspective that is demand derived economic thinking and argues 
better in terms of employment and labor market dynamics. The neoclassical migration 
theory is a good tool to examine the relation between the migration processes and the 
welfare, because the welfare itself is based on this idealistic “perfect world”15 model. The 
neoclassical migration theory describes the relationship between income and opportunity 
differentials.  People are expected to move from low income to high income an area that 
is based according to de Haas on the theoretical framework of the lows of migration on 
Ravenstein (1885).
16
 According to de Haas it is important to note that this proposition 
still underlies neoclassical migration theory and popular push-pull models. In line with 
                                               
12 Hein de Haas ; IMI University of oxford working papers year 2010, p.2 
13 Haas 2010: p. 2 
14 Note: A term coined by Adam Smith in his 1776 book "An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations" 
15 Note: When I mention the expression “perfect world” I refer to the words of Prof. Jesper Jespersen from 
the political economic lectures, when he clarifies the difference between the two worlds of economics. 
16 Haas 2010: p. 3 
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equilibrium assumptions, they presume an inversely proportional relationship between 
development differentials and volumes of migration. According to de Haas’ 
argumentation, this leads to the hypothesis that most migration occurs between the 
poorest and wealthiest places and countries. The idea that migration and development are 
substitutes also leads to the hypothesis that wealthy societies have lower overall levels of 
migration than poorer societies. 
17
 
 
According to the same author, the migration is a function of spatial disequilibria 
constitutes the cornerstone assumption of so-called ‘push-pull’ models which still 
dominate much gravity-based migration modeling as well as commonsensical and non-
specialist academic thinking about migration. Lee (1966), who revised Ravenstein’s 
migration laws, stated that migration decisions are determined by ‘plus’ and ‘minus’ 
factors in areas of origin and destination; intervening obstacles (such as distance, physical 
barriers, immigration laws, and so on); and personal factors. Push-pull models usually 
identify various economic, environmental, and demographic factors which are assumed to 
push migrants out of places of origin and lure them into destination places”18 That makes 
it relevant to use push and pull factor theoretical framework in choosing the better 
variables for analysis of the migration processes.   
 
The push and pull factor theoretical framework is a good tool to examine empirically 
some of the reasons that provoke people to migrate to Denmark. 
Neo-classical economic theory usually sees migration as a function of geographical 
differences in the relatively scarcity of labor and capital. Todaro, Haris and Maruszko 
used this theoretical framework to explain rural-urban migration in developing countries 
but this framework has also been applied to international migration.
19
 The neo-classical 
economic theory sees migration as a function of geographical differences in the relatively 
scarcity of labor and capital. The resulting wage differentials cause workers to move from 
low-wage, labor-surplus regions to high-wage, labor-scarce regions. Refinements of this 
model incorporate costs and risks of migration, and interpreted migration as an 
                                               
17 Haas 2010, p.3 
18  Haas. 2010: p.4 
19 Borjas 1989, Todaro and Maruszko 1987; Referred by Haas 2010: p. 4 
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investment in human capital.
20
 Within this perspective, individual migration decisions are 
made by rational actors who are guided by comparing present discounted value of 
lifetime earnings in alternative geographic locations, with migration occurring when there 
is a good chance of recouping human capital investments. This points to the importance 
of looking at the structure of labor markets, skill sets and income distributions in both 
sending and receiving societies in order to explain the volume and selectivity of 
migration”.21 This explanation could be used to argue for the relevancy of the use of that 
theoretical approach into the researched project area and the use of the labor migrants 
movement as a tool to observe the changes into the migration flows and their directions 
after the peak of the recession and answering the question if there is a relation between 
the crisis and more or less migration from the “PIGS” countries or the opposite. What 
actually derives the migration waves and are there most immigration from the “PIGS” 
countries or other Southern and Central European areas, because of processes that have 
started further before the crisis and have been enforced by its burst and the extra 
weakening of the politico-economic systems in those countries. 
 
Fig. 1 Neoclassical economic model:  
 
                                               
20 Bauer and Zimmermann 1999, Sjaastad 1962; Referred by Haas 2010: p. 4 
21 Haas 2010: p.4 
Supply 
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Fig. 2 The model of the U-curve represented from Hein de Haas
22
 
 
  
 
3.2. Push and Pull Factors of Migration Theory 
 
One of the main supporters and most quoted author when it comes to the push- and pull 
factor model is Lee (1966). The push and pull factors can be two types on voluntary or 
forced migration. The focus here will be on some of the push- and pull- variables of 
volunteer migration that will be relevant to the discussion of the statistical data exposed 
into the analysis section.  
 
In Lee’s push – and pull- factor model from 1966 is assumed that the “different push and 
pull factors dictate the act of migration. Factors associated with the area of origin push 
the migrant, whereas factors related to the distribution country pull the migrant and 
intervening events and personal characteristics interfere with these gravities”.23 Into the 
original theoretical hypothesis, “the composition of society in destination countries and 
                                               
22 Cover page of  de Haas’ (2010) “Migration Transitions” : p. 1 (cover page) 
23 Lee 1966. pp. 49-50 
Emigration 
Immigration 
Migration 
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economic factors are considered as push and pull factors or a welfare provisions”.24 The 
push and pull factor model is based on widely known assumption about the behavior of 
migrants. The impact of the welfare on labor and forced migration is not identical. While 
labor migrants have greater probability of securing employment after their arrival in the 
host countries via being selected by companies, guest-worker schemes or by point-based 
enrollment systems, asylum seekers depend more on the welfare state, because they may 
be prohibited from working or less informed about employment possibilities. The welfare 
provisions are very often related to the labor market participation”.25 This is an important 
theoretical base to be argued for within the statistical analysis part.   
 
The factors that encourage migration are different into the different countries and have 
different hierarchy of importance. Generally, demand-pull and supply-push factors are 
strongest at the beginnings of a migration flow, and network factors become more 
important as migration streams mature. This means that the first guest workers tend to be 
recruited, but after some migrants return, network factors can become more important in 
sustaining migration. Once networks mature, the classic economic migration decision 
model in which migrants have a sure income at home and an uncertain income abroad
 
can 
be reversed, and the prospect of a steady job abroad can be preferred to an uncertain 
income from local farming at home.
26
 That is strong push and pull factor before the 
recession period and also a push factor that have stronger effects on the countries with 
not so certain and stable economies and some of the ex-Communistic countries from the 
Periphery.  
 
Another very important push and pull factor in terms of the hypothesis discussed in the 
project is the family unification. It is the most important non economic factor 
encouraging migration. The migration literature often uses nautical metaphors, discussing 
pioneers who become anchor migrants and produce follow-on chain migration.
27
 Most 
                                               
24 Lee 1966. pp. 52-53
  
 
25 Menz 2008, pp. 395-401; Schulzek: p. 9-10 Chapter 3. 
26 Martin, Ph. 2005. p.4-5 
27 Martin, Ph. 2005, p.5 
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European countries allow family unification for legal foreign residents after a year of 
employment and proof that they can support arriving family members. 
 
The international migration is a result of differences that make one place more attractive 
than another: and that “Economic differences between countries are widening, 
encouraging migration over national borders for higher incomes and jobs.” 28 
 
Some authors as D. Massey
29
  argues that the push-pull framework led to the emergences 
of new theoretical perspectives which seek to analyze interplay of individuals, 
motivations and contexts better than the neo-classical framework. That is an interesting 
point of view in addition to my hypothesis. One of the theories that emerged in 
connection with the push and pull factors theoretical framework is the so called gravity 
theory that argues over the magnet factors that attract immigrants from countries with 
different political-economical structure to the welfare structures as those into the 
Scandinavian states and Switzerland and Germany. This theory will be very interesting to 
use as a tool into the following research in order to demonstrate the relation between 
more migration to Denmark and its attractiveness as a place with more stable economical 
and political atmosphere and better living standards in a situation of crisis.     
 
The push and pull factors taken into consideration into the thesis are:  not enough jobs, 
few opportunities, loss of wealth (push factors); job opportunities, better living 
conditions, better education, better medical care, security, family links  (pull factors).
30
  
 
The reason why it is good to be used theories that emphasize economic factors is that 
they capture broader social framework in which the decisions for migration into one 
country or not are taken.  
 
                                               
28 Martin, Ph. 2005, p.6 
29
 Massey, Douglass S., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaouci, A., Pellegrino, A., Taylor, J.E. 1998. 
Worlds in motion. Understanding international migration at the end of the millennium. 
Clarendon Press Oxford 
30 Note: See Lee, 1966 
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The push-pull factors’ framework emphasizes the economic context of the flow of 
workers.
31
 Push-pull factors introduce relational aspects into thinking about migration 
and compose dyadic frames in which migration flows are studied empirically. As push 
and pull factors are largely a mirror-image of each other, the framework has been 
criticized for its inability to determine which of the two factors are dominant and that , 
the differences in the relative scarcity of labour can be aptly 
expressed in one single variable, that is, wage differentials.
32
  
  
 
The following work is taking into a consideration the common assumption that economic 
migrants are more attracted to the welfare state than forced migrants, because they have 
more time in assessing costs and benefits of their migration, compared to the 
persecuted.
33
 The further argumentation will be presented into the analytical part of the 
project.  
 
3.3. Theories of Welfare State and Migration 
  
Within the discussion over the different models of welfare the most famous author’s 
hypothesis is the one of Esping Andersen from 1999, where he describes the features of 
the different welfare model types as a  welfare typology scheme division of three groups 
of welfare systems: liberal; corporative and the socio-democratic. The discussion that the 
author is leading in addition to the welfare benefits and the welfare as a magnet pull 
factor for immigrants makes its work relevant for the purpose of the project. According to 
the literature there is a connection between the welfare as magnet pull factor and the 
migration waves coming to the different welfare structures. Andersen and Schulzek 
underline some of the features of the welfare state that makes certain models more legally 
opened and immigrant welcoming structures than the other. One of the most important 
arguments for the purpose of this research is the one for grouping the features of the 
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different welfare models in addition to the type of migrants they attract, more skilled, or 
more unskilled workers, or asylum seekers.  
 
The project is focusing on the volunteer migrants, because it handles on inner-European 
migration and there is not a situation of a war or another forced push factors for 
provoking immigration from one European country to another, so the migration group 
with these features for Europe would be only the asylum seekers that are not a main 
target and have not a main focus into the analytical framework of this project.  
 
Esping Andersen classifies three welfare state types: the liberal, the corporatist and the 
social-democratic state
34
. These three types differently attract forced and voluntary 
migrants.
35
 According to Schuzeck that refers to Andersen’s typology the different 
models are exemplified through different countries. The United Kingdom is representing 
the liberal model of welfare structure, Germany is representing the corporatists’ model of 
welfare structure and Sweden is representing the social-democratic model of welfare 
structure. 
36
 
 
In Schuzeck’s analysis there is a good exemplifying of explanation of the Andersen’s 
models with an explanation of how the models work in different countries when it comes 
to migration and welfare system’s specifics. The author starts with the United Kingdom, 
the United States of America and Australia that are liberal welfare states and are 
characterized by minimalist welfare provisions (only basic needs).
37
 Schuzeck clarifies 
that this type of welfare structure relies on the private sector social insurance. It has 
market-efficient policies that identify it and subsidiary of private provisions that 
encourage the market.
38
 According to the same source it also is characterized with a 
class-political dualism between the poor and the rich.
39
 Schuzeck  exemplifies through 
the British welfare model type to follow the influence over the immigration policies that 
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creates requipment system that is efficient for all skill levels, because economic demands 
change quickly, part-time or casual work is favored, which reduces the class of labor for 
companies.
40
 
 
The author continues with the corporatist welfare state example that is represented 
according to both Schuzeck and Andersen from countries as Austria, France, Germany or 
Italy, because they have historical corporatist statist legacy detached the market from the 
welfare social rights. This type of welfare structure is based on status differentials among 
classes’ occupations and gender by focusing on the male-breadwinner model. The 
insurance system is decisive for benefits. Germany is an example for how the corporative 
welfare characteristics influence migration politics. Labor migration policies are 
responsible for short as well as long term demands for the economy.
41
  It is very 
important for the meaning of the project to be exposed the welfare state typology and to 
be made certain division between the models in order to be seen the size of the welfare 
benefits and the size of the welfare magnet of the different countries. The example with 
Germany is very essential, because that could be an explanation of the question what 
makes the social democratic welfare model more attractive to immigrants than the 
corporatist one. What makes Germany less attractive than Denmark for different migrant 
groups? One answer of this question could be social and immigration politics. Good 
example for functioning of the immigration politics into the corporatist German model of 
welfare that is given from Schuzeck with the guest-workers schemes after the WWII that 
brought years of economic growth and that the financing of the welfare does not 
differentiate between labor migrants and native workers.
42
 
 
Schuzeck, referring to Andersen, sees that the Scandinavian model of welfare structure is 
based on expansive transfer of payments, principles of social rights and universalism. It is 
best known for all social benefits for all social classes. It illustrates equality of highest 
standards, a high level of unionisatism, egalitarian wage distribution, huge public sector 
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employment and high female labor market participation
43
. Given its values of equality 
and universalism, welfare benefits are universal for labor migrants for example in the 
Swedish welfare state. Sweden is the first state that granted political rights to 
foreigners.
44
 Andersen referred in Schuzeck’s work underlines the very important role of 
the so called trade unions. According to the author the Trade Unions in the Swedish case, 
constantly insisted upgrading wages and skills of immigrants, as well as providing 
foreign workers with social benefits, sick pay and pensions. Labor-law compliances 
prevent migrants from undermining labor market regulations protection of domestic 
workers.
45
 The Swedish example is quite relevant when it comes to the Danish type of 
welfare structure, because the structure of the welfare and the legal systems of the two 
countries are quite similar. The model illustrated also talks about the immigration and 
social policies building and explains partly the attractiveness of the Scandinavian model 
as a magnet pull factor for immigrants from countries with not so beneficial and secure 
politico-economical systems.   
 
Schuzeck underlines something very important for the purposes of this project in her 
work that the impact of the welfare state on the labor migrants in the different welfare 
types of state is different.
46
 The author divides the systems as follows: The Liberal type 
of welfare structure is most attractive to economic migrants; because they constantly 
accommodate labor immigration schemes to increase market efficiency. The domestic 
workers are not protected to prevent wage pressure and decreasing labor standards, 
wherefore economic migrants have more space for foundry their niche on the labor 
market, even if the safety net is rather small.
47
 The favors marked-based economics, but 
strong labor regulations and low-paid “contract work” are less attractive for labor 
migrants.
48
 The conditions that are presented into the corporative model are immigrant 
welcoming, but the social-democratic welfare structure is one of the most immigrant 
welcoming one, because of the high wages and the high social benefits that all the 
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citizens and foreigners that are working on the territory of the country have a free access 
to, as well as language learning supported from tax-payers money. These things are done 
in terms of better integration of the immigrants, and their better chances to find a job in 
the countries’ territory, as well as taking better education. There are a lot more benefits 
for asylum seekers that make this type of model even more attractive for them.    
 
Following the same author’s ideas, Schuzeck continues with the specifics of the liberal 
model of welfare state in terms of UK, the US and Australia as liberal welfare states are 
characterized by minimalist welfare provisions (only basic needs) and this model relies 
on the private sector social insurance through market-efficient policies that identify it. 
This regime has subsidiary of private provisions that encourage the market. There is a 
class-political dualism between the poor and the rich.
49
 This make the system very 
unequal and inequality increases the gabs between the rich and poor social layer that 
disturbs the welfare ideal itself. And how Schuzeck writes, referring to Castles that the 
UK example for liberal welfare state model influence over the immigration policies that 
creates requitement system that is efficient for all skill levels, because economic demands 
change quickly, part-time or casual work is favored which reduces the class of labor for 
companies
50
. These factors makes that type of welfare welcoming for labor migrants 
more than other, but it also means that there will be more unskilled workers coming into 
the country, because there are not enough social benefits that provide easier integration of 
the new-comers. Also there are bases for illegal migration increase.
51
 
 
If I get back to the Germany as an example for this how the corporative welfare 
characteristics influence migration politics and look on the labor migration policies that 
are responsible for short as well as long term demands for the economy.
52
 Nowadays 
there are consequences from this type of migration politics with the increase of the 
number of the unskilled workers especially from Turkey that is a consequence from the 
so called “guest-workers scheme” politics.  
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Schulzeck refers to Faist that gives a good perspective of looking over the Social 
democratic regime as it is mostly based on expansive transfer of payments, principles of 
social rights and universalism. It is best known for all social benefits for all social classes. 
It illustrates equality of highest standards, a high level of unionisatism, egalitarian wage 
distribution, huge public sector employment and high female labor market participation.
53
 
Given its values of equality and universalism, welfare benefits are universal for labor 
migrants for example in the Swedish welfare state
54
 in addition the Danish as well. These 
principles are very attractive for increased migration to these types of structures. But with 
the role in the socio-democratic welfare structure of the trade unions that according to 
Schulzeck that refers to Ruth Martin constantly insist upgrading wages and skills of 
immigrants, as well as providing foreign workers with social benefits, sick pay and 
pensions, but labor-law compliances prevent migrants from undermining labor market 
regulations protection of domestic workers.
55
 That gives security of the native population 
that would not experience high unemployment rates and demographic shocks because of 
too many immigrants coming on the territory of the country. According to the same 
author referred by Schuzeck the impact of the welfare state on the labor migrants in the 
different welfare types of state is different. The Liberal type is most attractive to 
economic migrants; because they constantly accommodate labor immigration schemes to 
increase market efficiency. The domestic workers are not protected to prevent wage 
pressure and decreasing labor standards, wherefore economic migrants have more space 
for foundry their niche on the labor market, even if the safety net is rather small
56
. The 
favors marked-based economics, but strong labor regulations and low-paid “contract 
work” are less attractive for labor migrants.” 57  
 
All the above discussion illustrates the pluses and minuses of the different welfare 
models type. To understand better what makes the social model of welfare more 
attractive than the other models to immigrants it is needed to be looked into the welfare 
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magnet pull factor hypothesis that looks over the welfare structure as a pull factor for 
volunteer migration.  
 
3.4. The Welfare Magnet Factor Hypothesis  
 
The founder of the original idea of the welfare magnet hypothesis is Borjas. He exposes it 
first in his work from 1999.
58
 This hypothesis refers to one of the main features of the 
welfare model especially when it comes to Scandinavian type of welfare the welfare 
generosity and how the welfare generosity acts as a pull factor for migration and how it 
influences the skill composition of immigrants and more specifically, as Ruth Martin, 
referred from Schuzeck, describes it, it states that immigrants prefer to locate in countries 
with generous welfare provisions to insure themselves against labor Market risks.59 
Borjas makes the connection between the welfare dependencies and explains through this 
hypothesis what makes the welfare attractive or a pull factor for immigrants. This 
hypothesis will be used in the context of the project in meaning to investigate the 
question what makes the Danish welfare model attractive to immigrants. Borjas explains 
the welfare dependency through the welfare magnet factor hypothesis. In countries with a 
high standard of living and a generous system of public transfers, low-income groups 
have high compensation rates. Hence, a special selection of immigrants is coming to 
these countries - both in terms of educational attainment and motivation in general.
60
 For 
Denmark this may very well be the case. For the tied-movers, mostly consisting of 
marriage migrants, the wish to live in a highly developed country may be one of the main 
reasons for involving in migration.
61
 For refugees, their emigration decisions are not 
considered voluntary, but the choice of where to apply for asylum may be influenced by 
the knowledge of the welfare systems in potential host countries.
62
  Blume also 
underlines that for refugees for example we are talking about forced migration but he 
assumes that there is a possibility that they choose the country in which they can search 
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asylum.
63
 Razin and Wahba sees fears in the states that the immigrants are a fiscal drain 
and increasing concerns that the welfare state generosity works as a social magnet to 
immigrants.
64
  
 
According to Blume, there is a positive or negative net contributors to the welfare system. 
As well as individuals can either be positive or negative net contributors to the welfare 
system. If individuals pay a larger amount in tax than they receive in public services and 
transfers, they are positive net contributors to the welfare state and vice versa. Generally, 
individuals in their working age are expected to be positive net contributors to the welfare 
state.
65
 This explanation of Blume is very good to describe the Danish welfare system 
functioning. Blume argues as well that immigrants from non-western countries, however, 
tend to be negative net contributors to the welfare state, especially in the period 
immediately after migration. If immigrants become positive net contributors to the 
welfare state in the long run as they integrate into the host-country labor market, 
immigration can be looked upon as an “investment” with start-up costs (initial negative 
net contributions) and future pay-off (future positive net contributions). However, for this 
“investment” to be profitable, future pay-off needs to be positive; i.e. future public 
expenses on immigrants should be low.
66
 That implements specific political measures.  
 
The view that is exposed from Razin and Wahba is that the skill composition of  
immigrants depends on many factors, and in particular on the policy regime.
67
 According 
to the same authors the generosity of the welfare state may affect the skill composition of 
immigrants differently depending on which immigration policy is adobted.
68
 They make 
the connection between the principle of generosity in terms of total government spending 
on social insurance welfare benefits social investment and the self-selection of the 
potential migrants(supply side) and the immigration policy into the destination 
                                               
63 Blume: p 1 
64 Razin and Wahba Migration Policy and the Generosity of the Welfare State 2010: p 28 
65 Blume p.2 
66 Ibid p. 2 
67 Razin and Wahba 2010: p. 28 
68 Ibid p 28 
 28 
country(demand side).
69
The same authors refer to Borjas that the low-skilled migrants are 
much more heavily clustered in high benefit states, in comparison to other migrants or 
natives. The unskilled workers are motivated by social expenditure much more than the 
skilled workers.
70
 That argument is a good explanation for some of the data 
representented into the analytical part of the project that is discussing the number of the 
unskilled and skilled workers in Denmark in addition to the migration politics that are led 
in that timeline on the territory of the country. Another very important argument exposed 
by Razin and Wahba is that the free migration into the EU the generosity of the welfare 
state acts as a magnet for the unskilled workers and that suggests that the minimum 
welfare provision within the EU may be an option to reduce the negative effect of the 
welfare state on the skill composition of EU migrants under free migration.
71
 This 
argument is important as a way to show the dependency between welfare legacy and 
migration flows control. The project hypothesis partly suggests that there is a direct effect 
between the composition of the migration flows and the welfare State migration policies. 
An interview in Copenhagen Post from March 12
th
 2012 with the minister of social 
affairs Karen Hækerup exposes an interesting view of the minister that “the welfare state 
will become unafortable unless some cuts are made.”72 The article exposes good 
argumend about that why there is a need of a reform in the Danish welfare model and 
what is the role of the government. The further argument continues with a black 
predictiction that “in 20 years time, Denmark may not be able to afford all the social 
services currently offered.”73  According to the same article this is the official 
governmental position over the question. The minister declares more cuts from services 
as it is quoted in the article ““If we want to improve some things, then we will have to cut 
others. We cannot afford to keep on giving all the tax-financed social services we 
currently offer. If we want to preserve the welfare state, it doesn’t help to believe that it 
can continue growing unhindered.”74 The suggested reforms from the minister provoked 
sharp reaction of critisism from the Danish People’s Party and The Conservative Party, 
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because as the leader of the People’s Party  Pia Kjærsgaard declares into the discussed 
article “It’s as though the government is targeting areas which would cause the most 
pain," They are targeting the weak, the handicapped and the aged. But where is the Social 
Demokraternes and Socialistiske Folkeparti’s empathy? Where are their feelings for those 
who have hard lives when they also bring up cutting the top tax bracket in a tax 
reform.”75 Kjærsgaard according to the article  puts very important argument when it 
comes to immigrants that is “arguing that the government has been too soft on groups 
who take the most (immigrants) while being too hard on those who have already paid in 
to the welfare system (the elderly).”76 According to the same source “her criticism 
focused on the government’s abolition of certain low-value cash welfare benefits that 
were introduced by the former government to incentivise entering the workplace but were 
ultimately criticised for keeping recipients in cycles of poverty. According to Kjærsgaard, 
abolishing them meant the government now faces a 804 million kroner bill through 
increased welfare payments to recipients who would now rather receive a check from the 
state than work.”77 Her opinion is confirmed from the Konservative Party, because “most 
political parties have expressed cautious optimism at streamlining the welfare state”.78 
“Everyone cannot expect to get as much back from the state as they pay in, otherwise 
there would be nothing to redistribute to the weakest,” Konservative leader Lars Barfoed 
told Berlingske, adding that he supported examining age-conditional services for cuts.
79
 
This debate is very interesting in order to observe the different political moods when it 
comes to what kind of reforms should be done into the welfare state. There should be also 
berried in mind that this period of time of decision-making is in the period of financial 
and economic misbalance, but not as hard as in 2008-2009. It is also interesting to 
observe the resent debate in the media from May 2013 in addition to the consequences of 
the welfare social and immigration politics in Sweden. As a consequence of the too 
generous welfare and too soft immigration politics there have been too many immigrants 
in the country that exhausts the system, because of the incredibly high levels of 
unemployment in all the Swedish history and as a consequence this provoked frustration 
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and dissatisfaction between some immigrant groups that burst into a violence. Some 
organization’s leaders criticize the governmental politics while the official authorities 
keep on insisting that the principle of generosity is one of the most important features of 
the social democratic welfare state and if that is meant to be changed by the law it means 
that there will be no more welfare in the meaning we know it today.
80
   
Following the last track of thoughts it is important for the welfare to contribute politics 
that make the state more skilled migrant welcoming and to be reduced the number of 
unskilled immigrants. A confirmation of the exposed hypothesis is a research over the 
topic that is reflected into an article in Copenhagen Post. The article is discussing the 
positive impact on the foreign skilled workers on the welfare state and even suggests that 
they are needed there.
81
 Jenifer Buley argues that “facts presented in a just released 
research study show that highly educated immigrants – whether they come from 
developed ‘Western’ countries or under-developed ‘non-Western’ ones – are putting far 
more money into the state’s coffers than they are taking out. The Centre for Economic 
and Business Research (CEBR) study – which is co-funded by Microsoft and Dansk 
Industri (DI), an association representing more than 10,000 Danish companies – is the 
first of its kind to measure Denmark’s net profit from highly educated foreign workers.”82 
The argument exposed further is that “the average highly-educated foreigner (not to be 
confused with ‘highly-skilled foreigners’, a term that specifically refers to those enjoying 
three-year tax breaks) who comes to Denmark with a partner and children, stays for eight 
years and puts an extra 1.9 million kroner into the state’s coffers – even after using the 
schools, hospitals, and other social benefits – the study concluded. By contrast, the 
average highly-educated foreigner who comes to Denmark without children stays for six 
years and leaves the state with an extra 900,000 kroner in its treasure chest. The 
researchers compared how highly educated ‘non-Western’ immigrants stacked up against 
their ‘Western’ counterparts in purely economic terms; they found that where the 
immigrants come from makes little difference. More significant are their areas of 
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expertise. While all highly-educated immigrants are more ‘profitable’ for the state than 
Danes, according to the study, immigrants with advanced degrees in the humanities 
contributed less than those with advanced degrees in the sciences. Foreign technical 
experts, like engineers and architects, fell somewhere in the middle.”83 Furthermore 
according to the same source that confirms the hypothetical argument followed “at the 
same time, the study found, highly-educated foreigners pay significantly more in taxes 
each year than the average Dane does; the highly-educated ‘non-Western’ immigrants 
paid roughly 16 percent more than the average Dane, while the ‘Western’ ones paid 
roughly 32 percent more.
84
 In the article “Jan Rose Skaksen, an economics professor 
from Copenhagen Business School, and one of the CEBR study’s authors, told 
Berlingske newspaper that the data surprised even him. “It has now been demonstrated – 
and I am in fact really amazed – how large a profit the highly educated [foreigners] 
yield,” Skaksen said.”85 The official report’s conclusions in the Jacobsen’s work are that 
“an average highly educated immigrant with packed family will be in Denmark for 8 
years and contributes around. 1.9million to the public purse; highly educated immigrant 
with no picnic family will be in Denmark for 6 years and contributes around DKK 
900,000 to the public purse; an immigrant without being brought family in Denmark for 3 
years and contributes around. DKK 650,000 to the public purse. More specifically, the 
report that: highly educated immigrants generally pay more in taxes than an average 
Dane. Highly educated immigrants take advantage of the offers in the health sector far 
less than the Danes and goes for example half as much to the physician.”86 The graphs 
with the data could be found in Appendix 2.   
3.5. Deselecting Theory 
 
Into the process of working there have been some theories that required to be put outside 
the research, because of time-limitation, and because of not complete relevance in 
connection with the problem statement and the research questions, as well as with the 
data collection presented as arguments into the analysis. 
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Some authors as Mabogunje 1970 talk about “urban migration”. That is referenced by de 
Haas
87
 for example and are one of the very much used names into the migration studies 
are into the context of the ongoing project will be not relevant to be used. The project is 
not aiming to investigate just urbanization migrating processes. There is an aim to be 
looked over the migration as a global process. When the focus is on international 
migration it means that this requires a selection of a proper approach that could examine 
the migration processes on an inner-European level and those processes that show the 
interrelation between migration waves and the changing into the welfare system. With the 
use of this argument the meaning will be that many of the functualist approaches into the 
migration theories could not be used, because it is hard to give a complete broader 
perspective of the project area investigated.  For example “the labor migration system of 
the West and Southern Africa observed by Arrigui and Saul 1968 often is imposed by 
external forces such as capitalism, as Hein de Haas argues in his work.
88
  The 
functionalist and Structualists’ theories were not able to explain “dis equilibrating 
processes”89, as the neoclassical theories do. De Haas explains that “this has given rise to 
neo-Marxist and structuralist theory as well as post-modern approaches in social sciences, 
with the former emphasizing power inequalities and migrants’ lack of agency and the 
latter stressing the diversity and complexity of human behavior, and the alleged 
impossibility of squeezing this diversity into overarching, all-explaining theoretical 
frameworks.”90 The structualist approach is not taken really into a consideration into the 
project, but actually it is a very important tool to understand and analyzing some of the 
push and pool factors provoked by the influence of the crisis. This was made with the 
concern that there are theoretical gabs that could be better fulfilled with the ideological 
approach of the neoclassical migration theory. De Haas underlines that “many parallels 
can also be drawn with neoclassical migration theory, which explains migration as a 
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response to wage or other opportunity differentials; individuals are propelled by such
91
 
macro-forces and their migration reduces the disequilibria within the system in a process 
of ‘factor price equalization’.”92  No matter of these facts that is the theoretical 
framework followed into the track of the project in order to be easier to select to examine 
variables when the focus is aiming examination of the crisis-driven migration processes. 
Crisis-driven migration process means that the research is seeking factors that are 
enforced by the crisis as for example unemployment and different schemes for 
employment in the welfare structured governmental systems. “Therefore, migration 
systems theory still largely reflects (the now rather obsolete) social systems theory of the 
post-war period, which explains its strong functionalist character as well as its inability to 
account for the heterogeneity of migration system formation (the existence of different 
trajectories), change (growth, decline, stagnation) within existing migration systems as 
well as the role of agency (vis-à-vis structure) in explaining such change. Systems theory 
of that time was a bold attempt to comprehend and encompass social reality using the 
structural and functional approaches. The early approaches to systems theory saw and 
relied on analogies with other sciences in the spirit of integration of all the sciences (both 
natural and social sciences, cf. Bertalanffy 1950). The understanding and interpretation of 
‘a system’ as a complex of interacting elements (Bertalanffy 1950: 143) was often used in 
analogy to a biological organism with the stress on wholeness, sum, mechanization and 
centralization (Bertalanffy 1950: 143). Bertalanffy argued that it was possible to identify 
isomorphism in the patterns of behavior of various phenomena in completely different 
fields, ranging from biology, mechanics and demography to economics. He laid out the 
broad principles of general systems theory as a contribution to the development of a new 
formal ‘logico-mathematical discipline’ which applies to ‘any system of a certain type 
irrespective of the particular properties of the system or the elements involved’ 
(Bertalanffy 1950: 138).” (p.7.IMI) This approach is not an aim of the project and cannot 
be used to link the migration processes with the crisis and the welfare state. The relation 
between the crisis and the migration processes requires examination of the labor market 
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and statistical data research over the connection between the unemployment rates that are 
raised up by the crisis processes and pushed the people to migrate. Therefore it is more 
suitable to use the neoclassical migration theory. 
  
According to de Haas the “organist’s approach to social sciences was introduced by 
Comte and largely continued by Spencer and other early social theorists (Coser 1977). 
There was a widespread belief that society (social system) can and should conform to 
laws analogous to those for mechanics and physics; i.e. the society operates as a special 
case of a universally applicable natural law.” 93There is not taken into a consideration in 
the work “the highly structural (and functional) approach to social systems, continued by 
Parsons (1951), who attempted to develop and perfect a general analytic model suitable 
for analyzing all types of collectivities. Parsons attempted to integrate all the social 
sciences into an overarching theoretical framework that could be applied to every society 
and historical epoch, and address every aspect of human social organization and culture. 
He examined the relationship between the whole of a social system (the society, a group) 
and its parts (area of activity, members of a group).”94 This approach is not relevant to the 
meaning of the project because “in the Social System Parsons (1951) argued that the 
crucial feature of societies, as of biological organisms, is homeostasis (maintaining a 
stable state), and that their parts can be understood only in terms of their function within 
the whole (Parsons 1951). Parsons and other structural functionalists were influenced by 
Vilfredo Pareto’s view that societies could be analyzed as systems with self-equilibrating 
properties (1935). Four functional imperatives must be solved in order to continue 
existence – adaptation, goal-attainment, integration, and pattern maintenance.”95 
 
The other author that is discussing the modern approaches onto the migration theories 
field is Lucia Kurekuva. The author represents very good schematic model that 
distinguishes the different approaches. According to this systemization (see Appendix 1):   
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The World system theory implements too broad representation of the structural changes 
and concentrates on the flow of capital. The other disadvantage is that this theory will be 
much better to use in case of a research that requires more global perspective over 
looking into the migration flows. The research has regional focus and another problem 
with the theory that is as well pointed by Kurekuva is that this theory is hard to be 
empirically tested.  
 
The Dual Labor market theory has a focus over the national state and the labor demand, 
and the immigration policies on governmental level. First that theory is too much 
concentrated on the representation of the migration process into one state and it is not 
relevant to be used for a research on international structure as the EU. Another very 
important argument is that this theory excludes completely the push and pull factors that 
makes it irrelevant for the meaning of the research.  
 
4. Analysis   
 
4.1. The Danish Model of Welfare State 
 
4.1.1. Features and Development of the Danish Social System 
 
The analysis of the Danish social system should be part of the analytical framework of 
the project, because its history reflects directly over today’s visions of its development 
and rethinking of the influence of the so called “push” and “pull” factors for migration 
and the restrictions until the last two considering the decision of choice between the 
different groups of migrants.  
 
Fig. 3 Features of the Danish welfare state: 
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The main feature of the Danish welfare state model is that is a social- democratic model 
of welfare state.  The structure in fig. 3 above illustrates the main features of the social-
democratic welfare model as a whole.  
 
As some authors explain, “as a social democratic Welfare State, Denmark has offered 
universal and generous benefits promoting equality and diminishing stigmatisation; 
provision is almost entirely taxfinanced and public services play an important role. 
Consequently, welfare state spending has been traditionally high.”96 That means that the 
welfare magnet for immigrants will be bigger, but also means that the levels of welfare 
dependency will be also high. As Bogedan concerns that the example of Denmark shows 
that high public expenditure on the welfare state could be conserved.
97
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The Danish social system shows that the high social expenditures for keeping the welfare 
as welfare can be saved. That is why, as Bogedan underlines, that the Danish welfare 
system is accepted as a successful role model for successful re-construction of the 
welfare state model in Europe.
98
  
 
Therefore, Bogedan outline herself a question “how did Denmark readjust its welfare 
state to the changed environment”? In the meaning of the ongoing project I would 
transform the question into how does the unfolding economic crisis reflects  on the 
Danish welfare state and what kind of measures are taken from the Danish authorities to a 
respond of the Danish social system of the challenges of the crisis. Here comes the 
question does the crisis affects the labor market in Denmark? And how are influenced by 
the crisis the labor market of the local population and the immigrants?  Is the Danish state 
searching for possibilities for limitation of the immigration flows to the Danish labor 
market? Are there any restrictions on the Danish labor market?   
 
To try to have a hypothetical answer on the questions above there could be used the data 
presented in figure 4 below. With the comparison of the represented database it could be 
assumed that the employment rates over immigrants or foreign born is higher than the 
native one. This fact could have two explanations. One of them could be the welfare 
dependency as already mentioned previously in the project and the other argument that 
could be added to that could be the situation of a financial and economic instability as a 
consequence of the financial and economic crisis that increased to a global recession size 
exactly into the period 2008-2009 when there is an obvious dynamics into the 
employment rates of natives and foreign born on the territory of Denmark. It would be 
suggested that these movements are consequence of a crisis migration push factors and 
welfare migration magnet pull factors.  
 
In figure 4 could be observed that there is lowering of the number of employed foreign 
born people in Denmark from the period 2010 to 2011. From the other hand from 2008 to 
2009 there is an increase of the foreign born employed people and there could be a path-
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dependency between this process and the crisis. When the crisis had its peak in 2008 the 
number of employed native born Danes is quite high 79.2% and it decreases until 2011 
but there is a balance in the numbers that could be observed in figure 4. the numbers 
balance between 76.6 % and 74. 7%. In 2008 the foreign born employed were 66.3% that 
enlarged to 68.1% in 2009. This is the highest number of foreign born employed into the 
observed period. Most likely it looks like with the stabilization of the economy and the 
changes into the social, integration and immigration policies after 2009 the percentage of 
the employed between the foreign born decreases to 61.6% in 2011 that is the lowest 
percentage in the represented data. This could be explained with the recession and the 
business cycle that prefers to “play safe” and to higher people with experience and skills. 
There is not a significant change into the legal system and until 2011 there are still more 
unskilled workers coming on the territory of Denmark than skilled and the consequences 
of better politics in that matters could be observed with the discussed data. Since 2011-
2012 there is an intensive discussion and reform into the Danish immigration and social 
policies including taxation system, social benefits and special extra benefits for skilled 
immigrants that would like to be employed in Denmark. It is very important for the 
Danish welfare to have more skilled labor force, because the skilled labor is also a net 
contributor of the welfare itself. These are the people paying taxes and financing the 
welfare.  
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Fig. 4 Employment rates 2008-2011  
 
Employment Rates in Denmark 2008-20011 
Native Born (men + women) employed in 
% 
Foreign Born (men + women) employed in % 
2008 79.2 66.3 
2009 76.6 68.1 
2010 74.7 63.4 
2011 74.7 61.6 
 
Source: Eurostat OECD 2012 27.07.2012 Quarterly employment rates by gender and 
place of birth OECD countries 2008-2011. 
 
 
4.1.2. Policy development of the Danish Welfare System  
 
Bogedan makes the following policy development in four major welfare programmes: 
health care, labour market, old-age pensions and family since the 1970s.
99
 This is a good 
illustration of the Danish welfare legal system. Figure 5 tries to represent the model in 
more systemized way. The major features of the Danish welfare is the focus over that 
everyone in the state could have equal guaranteed health care that is covered by taxpayers 
money, insurance in case that they are unemployed. This is  covered by the labor market 
polices and the insurance that part of the taxed money go to a good pension fond that 
ensures the secured income and good old days and the family is in meaning that the main 
idea some politico-economic structuring of the welfare model in general is the 
concentration on a single household. So this model assumes that if the basic needs for a 
single household are covered that all the people in the state could live in one balanced, 
equalized perfect system with complete market equilibrium and full employment. This is 
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the neoclassical macroeconomic thinking that is on the base of the heart model of the 
welfare state. This explains why the main focus is in the features exposed in fig. 5.  
 
Fig.5 Major Welfare programs: 
 
  
 
4.1.2 Brief History of the Danish Welfare  
 
According to Bogedan the basic structural elements of the Danish model of welfare state 
are: tax-financed universal and generous social rights based on citizenship; state 
monopoly in social policy provision; high quality services and wide-ranging state 
intervention income redistribution
100
 That explains why there is a system of high taxing 
in Denmark. The idea with the high taxes is that people could get more social benefits if 
they pay more taxes, so this money can be used to subsidize the public sector.  
 
The same author exposes the historical structurizing of the Danish welfare. Bogedan 
underlines that “in historical perspective there are three main stages of formation of the 
Danish welfare model.  The first stage of formation of the welfare model started already 
with the beginning of the industrialization process and the unification of the workers in 
terms of better working conditions.
101
 From the period between 1849 until 1967 the 
different political groups have been formatted that determines today the structure of the 
Danish parliament. There have been also some legislative changes as the creation of the 
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fatiglov or the poor law that implements that every person that is a citizen of Denmark 
should has its financial and social security provided from the state along with the health 
insurance law.
102
 This is a very good illustration of the beginning of the building of the 
model used nowadays into the governing the Danish society.  The same author continues 
with the systematization of the structuring of the Danish welfare as describing the second 
stage that according to her “implements the social democratization of the political idea 
behind the welfare model and the process of nationalization. After 1924 when the social 
democratic party had a priority on the elections the government established prioritized 
social policy model. The third stage was where the welfare model as we know it today 
has been established. The period shortly after the Second World War is very successful 
for Denmark and it is also called “the Golden Age”103 This is the time when the idea of 
the welfare for the people has been born.
104
 The benefits as folkepension (flat-rate basic 
pension); [1960s] invalidelav (disability law); illness (sygekasselov), social assistance 
(forsorgslov), etc.
105
 The meaning of all of these new laws was to increase the social 
benefit or the social welfare.   
  
After the expenditure of the welfare social-democratic regime there were needed some 
reforms that prevent the expenditure of the welfare state that could create a conflict 
according to the experts into 10-20 years period.
106
 There were problems that has been 
seen into the model as for example the neoclassical requirement that there should be a 
full employment, but the problem here is that there are both men and women employed 
and there is a creation of multiplier effect on the women’s labor-market. 107 This is a very 
good illustration of the weakness in the system that provoked further reforms into the 
social politics and the Danish legacy.  
 
There have been also some changes into the Danish welfare after Denmark became a 
member-state of the European Union. There have been some restrictions required from 
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the EU’s rules and regulations that required changes on national legislative level. The 
other thing that influenced the Danish model was the implementing of fiscal policy. This 
fact implemented major changes into the economical system of the already created 
welfare political-economical model.
108
 This is very important fact that Bogedan 
underlines, because fiscal policy and being part of the EU means that Denmark is obliged 
to make its own regulations and legacy in coordination with the EU law. There are some 
international rules implemented from the EU that cannot stay outside the Danish legacy 
as for example the laws that concern asylum seekers. The Danish welfare model is quite 
attractive to asylum seekers because of the high benefits that provides for this type of 
migrants. It is true that they are immigrants that are product of forced migration but it is 
also true that they have the choice to choose the residence country. That makes the 
welfare magnet very strong and powerful pull factor for them. The problem with these 
group of immigrants is that they are very hard to integrate culturally into the Danish 
society and very often they are unskilled workers that creates higher possibility for them 
of being unemployed. These factors make them a threat for the welfare system and turn 
them even into a social burden. There is a need of further reforms to stop these processes. 
There is a try to reduce the number of asylum seekers and their residences that come 
through family reunification schemes through changes into the family law for example.  
More should be said about that into the next part of the project where there is a discussion 
about the historical perspective of the immigration policies.  
 
4.1.3. Historical Perspective of the Immigration Policies of the Immigration Policies 
of the Danish Welfare State  
 
As a connection to Bogedan’s discussion could be add as well the Andersen’s one. The 
author discusses two more of the welfare politics: the housing policies and the urban 
policies. The housing policies have a special support provided from the state, where the 
state works together with the private sector in order to ensure that every citizen is able to 
receive a shelter. The urban politics is a special expenditure from the government that is 
pointed to support the infrastructural projects into the cities. That is very important policy 
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also in addition to the European Union’s funding policies.  In terms of the housing 
policies there are special regulations that secure housing also for the immigrants on the 
territory of the country.
109
 That is a pull factor for a lot of refugees to come on the 
territory of the country, because the law itself gives them a lot of privileges. There are 
also special integration policies that secure the welfare of the immigrants and provide 
them with education, health care, financial help, etc in dependence of their status in the 
territory of the country that makes Denmark immigrant welcoming country.  
 
There is a similarity between the welfare systems of Denmark and the other Scandinavian 
states. Like the other Scandinavian countries, Denmark is a small, highly developed 
nation based on cultural homogeneity and social trust. Despite the impression left by the 
Mohammed cartoon affair in 2005 and early 2006, it has traditionally cultivated a self-
image of tolerance. Since World War II, it has developed a universalistic welfare state 
based on high levels of public provisions (health care, education, unemployment benefits, 
old-age pensions etc.), accessible to all citizens and residents in the country. 
110
  This 
argument is supported as well from Brochman. “The three Scandinavian countries--
Denmark, Norway and Sweden – have received immigrants for centuries, but the so-
called “new immigrants” from outside the OECD are mainly a post 1960s’ phenomenon. 
Before the Second World War, most immigrants were labor migrants from neighboring 
Scandinavian countries. The first “new immigrants” in the 1960s were labor migrants 
from Turkey, Yugoslavia, Morocco and Pakistan. This labor immigration lasted only till 
the early/mid 1970s where a new strict regulation was introduced – the so called 
“immigration stops”.  Labor migration became an issue again at the end of the century, 
particular after 2004 when EU enlarged to include Central European countries.
111
  This is 
a very good illustration of the policy changes that is influenced by the stream of the 
migration flows. 
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These welfare structures entail both a significant amount of state intervention in the 
social domain and economic redistribution across social groups. The system is rooted in 
ideas of social egalitarianism, but also in the assumption that citizens earn their 
entitlements by contributing (through taxation) over a lifetime of active work to the 
maintenance and growth of the national wealth. Cultural belonging and political rights 
are thus intertwined, and "equality" is interpreted to mean two different things 
simultaneously: "cultural similarity" and "political sameness" (in regards to civic 
rights).
112
  
 
Brochman’s argumentation continues with a discussion about the cultural homogeneity 
that is part of the ideological presumptions of the Danish welfare state together with the 
universalistic principles. The author assumes that these features make it easier to 
understand the immigration and integration processes in Denmark.
113
  The author 
assumes that the “emphasis has been on both trying to acculturate immigrants as speedily 
as possible by means of public control and regulation, and on extending egalitarian 
universalism to cover "old" citizens as well as newcomers. In this sense, the welfare state 
was viewed in the 1970s and 1980s as an instrument for efficient integration.
114
  
 
Brochman continues her argument with that “over time …the two historical staples of 
homogeneity and equality have come to be seen as obstacles to integration.” That 
explains the attitude that the immigrants are seen now as an unwelcome presence because 
cultural assimilation has been more difficult than originally expected.”115 This argument 
is very important when it comes to asylum seekers and unskilled immigrants. They are 
usually hard to integrate because of language barriers and a lot of the asylum seekers 
come from areas with lower development and are very often illiterate. This turns them 
immediately into a social burden or a fiscal drain how Razin and Wahba use this 
expression in their work that has been mentioned earlier.   
 
                                               
112 ibid. 
113ibid 
114 Brochman: p.3-6 
115
 Hedetoft U.; Denmark-Integrating Immigrants into a Homogeneous Welfare State  
 45 
According to Hedetoft, Denmark has not regarded itself as a country of immigration and 
this could be explained with the homogeneous population and until recently, immigration 
flows were moderate. Most immigrants in Denmark came from other Nordic or Western 
countries, and the country experienced more emigration than  immigration.
116
  
There are, as well, different legal norms that give the same rights to the citizens from 
Sweden or Norway as the citizens in Denmark including receiving social benefits as 
student help scholarship for example. This is due to agreements between the 
Scandinavian countries. Hedetoft continues his argument that in addition to the culturally 
homogeneity in the region, the welfare state was designed on the basis of a culturally 
similar citizenry, and the Danish economy has successfully adapted to a variety of 
international challenges by taking advantage of institutions built around a powerful sense 
of civic solidarity.
117
 This is important argumentation when it comes to look to 
immigrants and their integration in the Danish society and the welfare system as a whole. 
There were different programs implemented by the government in order to provide easier 
access of immigrants to the domestic labor market, so they could be beneficial for the 
Danish society, but later these politics dragged more immigrants through the system of 
the welfare magnet and that put into a threat the native Danes that could be left with no 
job in some sectors. Good example is the guest-worker’ schemes in Germany and the 
Scandinavian states. “Since the end of the guest-worker program was in the early 1970s, 
however, a growing numbers of immigrants, mainly refugees and family dependents of 
refugees and former "guest workers," have challenged the status quo.
118
 The funding of 
publicly financed goods and services in Denmark is universal, i.e. everybody contributes 
to the system by paying taxes”.119  The government still is working on different programs 
in order to attract more skilled workers on the territory of the country; because of how it 
was exposed into the argumentation hypothesis above they are good contributors for the 
welfare system.  
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According to Peter Nannestad that made a research over the Danish welfare state and the 
challenges that immigration puts in front of it Denmark as a universalistic, tax-financed 
welfare state with strong redistribution gains and looses from non-western migration 
might be redistributed both by native Danes and immigrants. The author as well assumes 
that the system itself both weakens and creates barriers for immigrants to enter the labor 
market.
120
 The author makes interesting research concerning the immigration processes 
after the war and how do they reflect the Danish welfare system since the year 2004. This 
is important overview on immigration over time that could be explanation of some of the 
political approach taken into consideration from the Danish government today. 
According to Nannestad Denmark experienced “baby boom” after the war and full 
employment, but this generation is now almost gone and the new generation of Danes 
experience demographic problems, because there are not so many new-born after that 
period in the next generation.
121
 This according to the author creates shortages of labor 
force and lowered the domestic demand for labor. In a situation like that the immigration 
looked as the best solution on the problem that provoked the government to organize the 
system of guest-workers from non-western countries into the 1960.-1970s. This was a 
temporary solution of the problem, because many of the unskilled workers had higher 
fertility capability and gave surplus to the demand of labor. The problem came later, 
because there were too large groups of these immigrants. As the author underlines the 
combination of generous welfare provisions and high tax pressure that are one of the 
main features of the Danish welfare state may lead to all adverse selection problem in the 
case of immigration as country that is most attractive immigrants with a relatively low 
market value.
122
  The author sees a positive perspective into the future of the immigrants 
from non-western countries that the next generation will be transformed into positive 
immigrants and will be net beneficial to the Danish welfare state.
123
 This research is 
staying outside the pointed project timeline, but it is a good historical overview of the 
migration flows to Denmark and how do they affect the Danish society and the welfare 
itself.  
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4.2. The Danish Welfare State and the Financial and Economic Crisis 
 
4.2.1. Features and Specifies of the Financial and Economic Crisis  
 
In order to understand the crisis as not a main push factor, but an important one that acts 
together in a combination with other push factors, stimulating the migration processes 
from certain parts of Europe to Denmark, there is a need to have a closer view to the 
financial and economic crisis into the period 2008-2012. In order to do that, first, I am 
going to present in short the reasons for the unfolding crisis.  
 
Authors like Costas Lapavistas see the link in connection to the European Monetary 
Union and the “instability that put the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 led to a major 
financial crisis that ushered in a global recession.”124 Here the key word is “recession”. 
This is not just a financial crisis that bubbled to an economic crisis with a global size. We 
are talking about global “recession”. This recession resulted “rising of the fiscal deficits 
for several leading countries of the world’s economy for the countries in the euro zone 
periphery.”125 There is difference into the economic development between the countries 
that are members of the EU, and are located into the center or the periphery. The 
countries in the center are more economically and politically developed and stable in 
addition to the countries from the periphery, because of number of historical reasons that 
reflected the economical and state structure development. The countries into the 
periphery have been “already deeply indebted after years of weakening competitiveness 
relative to the euro zone core, fiscal deficits led to restricted access to international bond 
markets. Peripheral states were threatened with insolvency, posing a risk to the European 
banks that were among the major lenders to the periphery. To rescue the banks the euro 
zone had to bailout peripheral states. But bailouts were accompanied by austerity that 
included deep recessions and rendered it hard to remain in the monetary union 
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particularly for Greece.”126 According to Lapavitsas the problem with the “PIG 
countries” (PIG countries - Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain) is mainly because of the 
fact that they are part of the euro zone, and they were not ready to accept the Euro. The 
acceptance of the Euro put the countries with weak developing economies into unequal 
position with the countries from the center like Germany and the Netherlands, for 
example. Another problem that Lapavistas sees is the “European Project” or the project 
of “European Integration” that means that countries like Spain should get to the standard 
of countries like Germany. The argumentation that Lapavistas uses is that “The threat to 
the euro would perhaps have been understood earlier, if it had been more attention paid to 
history.”127 The author makes parallel between the gold standard and the monetary 
standard, and makes the link between the gold crisis from the 1930s and the crisis today. 
His argumentation is based on the fixed exchange rates of the gold and the willing of the 
rich gold countries to save their gold and there is an open ideological link between the 
gold system and the monetary system. This argumentation could be used in defense of the 
hypothesis that the global crisis is not only financial but also economical in meaning that 
is a crisis for the EMU and the main European Union’s financial institutions, as the ECB 
and IMF and all the instruments for the so called economic integration programs that are 
so vital into the last decades for the EU and especially in addition to the new member-
states from the periphery that adopted the euro. The argument used by Lapavitsas is that 
“the EMU is similar to the gold standards inasmuch as it fixes exchange rates, demands 
fiscal conservatism and requires flexibility in labor markets. And insofar imposes a 
Monetary Policy across all member states, it is even more rigid. Governments have not 
desisted even when the mechanisms of the euro have grossly magnified the responsibility 
forces present in the European economy the burden has been passed onto the working 
people of Europe in the form of reduced wages and pensions, higher unemployment, 
unveiling of the welfare state, deregulation and privatization.”128  
 
The economic crisis in Europe hit most the private sector and specifically the banking 
system of the member states. That means that people loose trust into the local banks and 
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transfer their deposits into “a safe” bank. That means that people would choose a bank 
that they can trust and is located in a country that has a stable economy “in a risky” 
situation, or a period of strong economic shakes and instability. For example, with the 
risk to generalize, I would say that Germany is considered a stable economy and that has 
been proved through the years. That is why people from Spain, for instance, that are not 
so stable economy, will transfer their deposits into banks in Germany. Recently, the 
banks in Spain, if we keep on following the example, have no more cash (printed money), 
because  the people do not deposit their money any longer into the local private banks. 
That affects also the national banks, because they are part of that “vicious cycle”. The 
banks in Germany are responsible in front of the ECB and all the deposit money from the 
German banks goes to the ECB. In a crisis situation, because of the EU Treaty 
regulations the governments part of the EMU, and that are eventually bankrupted or 
running out of printed money are not allowed to borrow money directly from the ECB, or 
print their own money, but they can sell government bonds. So, the governments, like the 
Spanish or the Greek one, started selling bonds in order to have enough money to pay 
money to their citizens and support their social systems or the welfare state.  When they 
have not bonds to sell any longer, because the financial markets on which the bonds 
should be sold, evaluate the risk of their economies and that is how these bonds are sold 
to a high liquidity percentage of returning the external debt, that in a situation of a low 
economic growth cannot be paid back, because the percentage of liquidity is higher than 
the percentage of growth of a real GDP. This is how these states will be experiencing a 
total demand shock. Then the ECB had special exceptional rules for these bankrupted 
countries like Greece that they can borrow money directly from the ECB, because the 
ECB has the monopoly of printing money (Euros). This situation is more likely to be for 
countries with weak political and economic systems that are part of the Euro-zone as 
Greece and Spain, for example, and have too generous welfare. These factors do not 
make them immigrant sending countries as much as some countries in Central Europe for 
example. No matter of the high unemployment and the uncertain economical situation in 
their countries people still have high welfare benefits and the cost they have to pay for a 
migration does not pay back that what they could get as a benefit as unemployed in their 
own countries. Besides the crisis partly the welfare magnet is to blame for their worse 
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financial situation, because in the period of intensive economic growth, high salaries and 
high welfare benefits those countries were immigrant receiving countries. A lot of labor 
migrants were attracted to them and when the crisis hit their systems one of a sudden 
those people were unemployed that means that they are supposed to have some help from 
the state that puts an extra burden to the government. Here I would use Blum’s argument 
about the welfare dependency and that the labor migrants are more likely to experience 
higher welfare dependence rates than the natives.   
 
If I get back to the crisis that what is important, according to the economists, are the 
similarities into the economic and financial systems in countries inside the European 
Monetary Union and the Euro-zone. As we know, Denmark is part of the Monetary 
Union, but not from the Euro-zone that put it in better position in situation of a financial 
and economic crisis, because it has not the euro as a currency. That means that it will be  
not so expensive for Denmark, if there are some problems within the entire financial 
sectors when it comes to exchange rates though it might have an effect, because the 
Danish kroner is synchronized with the euro exchange rate and Denmark is part of the 
Monetary Union. That means that is supposed to follow the EMU exchange rate 
regulations. As Denmark is part of the Monetary union that means that the economic and 
financial policy of the country must be synchronized with the economical policies of all 
the other 25 members of the Monetary Union, no matter that Denmark is not sharing the 
same currency. Here, comes back the argument that the similarities are vital for the 
Monetary Union and it has a lot to do with the crisis consequences, and how the crisis 
affects the different economic systems. Similarities are built through changing the 
structure of the economy and the economic interdependency. The more you trade, the 
more interdependent you are. If you are too interdependent, then you are more likely to 
be hit by a demand shock. Demand shocks are typical economic disturbances in a 
situation of financial and economic crisis. When an economic system is weaker it is more 
open and it is more likely to experience demand shocks.  
 
When the crisis hit in 2008 the economic structures in Europe were not similar enough 
and they could have been changed more in order to avoid so strong impact on the crisis 
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especially when it comes to the Southern-European countries that have extremely 
unstable political and economic structures. When there is a situation of a crisis it is very 
important to have a focus over the Balance of payments. Balance of payments determine 
the import and export in a country, the productivity level, the level of GDP and in that 
relation the level of labor, How many workers do you need to produce one unit of a  
product (ULC). The ULC (labor cost for one unit) causality in that relation is leading to 
the balance of payments.  And to follow the meaning of these lines of thoughts should be 
noticed that there are not similar structures between the South and the North countries in 
Europe. The demand shock hits differently and the demand shock reaction is different. In 
the deficit countries, meaning the countries that are most hit by the crisis, the bank sector 
instability is caused mostly by that the private banks borrow abroad. In that case in those 
countries (example- Spain) the ULC development is speedily larger than in the other 
countries (example-Germany). If ULC was normal than the bank fragility will be lower. 
The Monetary policy of the EU is entirely undertaken by the ECB. They are landing to 
private banks at one rate that is coordinated between the ECB and the Central banks 
within the whole EU. This rate is too low into countries with high inflation. Most 
Southern-European countries are famous with their extremely high levels of inflation. If 
the ECB level of interest is not high enough then the country’s economy is hit by a 
demand shock. The countries into the periphery had too high inflation. The common 
policy instruments are geared to the EU countries themselves. Then ECB could set only 
one level of interest and in some countries it will be too low. The structure should be the 
same then a competition that is a good thing in a well-structured economy as those into 
the Northern countries is. The South countries are asked to make their own schemes as 
the Northern one, because they have proved that they are stable.   
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4.2.2. The Financial and Economic Crisis in Europe 2008-2012 as a push factor for 
migration 
 
4.2.2.1. The crisis and the labor market: 
 
The unfolding crisis that mostly hit the banking sectors left a lot of people without their 
pension saving, and let to the bankruptcy of a lot of companies and the close down of 
many working places. These factors increase the levels of unemployment especially into 
the private sector. One of the biggest disadvantages into a crisis period is that the private 
sector prefers to save instead of invest, because the market is unstable, and there are high 
levels of risk. That costs shortage of jobs, and less are employed, because the private 
companies prefer to higher people with long-term experience or high qualification. 
According to the statistics the crisis is a “push” factor for a migration in terms of better 
job opportunities, but the migration levels from the Southern-European countries that are 
most affected by the crisis is not so high in comparison with that one from countries like 
India, China, The United States, Thailand, the Philippines, etc. All these non-European 
countries immigrants are in the most part labor immigrants or come in Denmark because 
of family reunification. There is as well increase of the refugees and asylum seekers 
numbers but looking through the year’s statistics they are not changing drastically in a 
situation of a crisis.  
 
Surprisingly the labor immigrants are more from countries like Poland or Romania, 
instead of countries like Greece or Spain. These statistical contradictions with the idea 
exposed here that the crisis is a strong push factor for migration from countries most hit 
by it, comes from the angle that Greece and Spain have specific welfare structure that is 
too generous and provides the citizens with a huge amount of social benefits. These 
social benefits secure enough the people even in a crisis situation, and even though the 
people are out of job the cost of migration to another country would be too high or will 
equals the benefits that they would receive in a form of social financial help from their 
governments. These type of welfare systems attract as well a lot of labor immigrants from 
countries with unstable economies and political structures and these immigrants have the 
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same privileges as the native citizens, because of the generosity of the nature of the type 
of welfare. That exhausts the welfare and eventually in a crisis demand-shock situation 
there are not enough resources in these countries to be paid the costs of the welfare 
benefits. There are not enough even for the native population. So a push factor here is not 
so much the financial crisis but the welfare crisis in the most affected countries as 
Greece, Spain, Ireland, and Portugal (PIGS).  
 
When it comes to the Danish welfare-model, this is a model that attracts labor immigrants 
but implies special politics to attract specialists from specific areas, and to restrict the 
“immigrant invasion” from the unskilled workers from the not so developed politically 
and  economically countries from the southern European new member states (Poland).   
  
In sum first the crisis started as financial, debt and bank crisis and that growth on stages 
to a deep economic crisis and recession. The financial decease from the US shacked the 
European economy as fist a crisis into the mortage market (Spain) and after a debt crisis, 
and the third last phase is the bank crisis. These are the main structures of the crisis. This 
development could be accepted to be named From a Financial Meltdown to a Great 
Recession.  
 
Costas Lapavitsas gives very good example of the crisis and how does it affects Europe, 
and how the deformed system of the Euro zone reflects on the character of the crisis in 
the center and the periphery. First point that he has as that of the recession into the 
periphery countries of the Euro zone as a result of the deformed structure of the Euro 
zone and the unemployment into the periphery area as a consequence of the recession and 
the lower of the economic growth in these countries that sometimes gets and to negative 
variables in two-numbers’ number.  The example given by Lapavitsas is that from 
Eurostat:  
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Fig. 5 GDP Growth Rates
129
  
 
 
When it comes to unemployment rates that are of interest inter-dependency of the 
following project Lapavitsas has very good example scheme from Eurostat.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unemployment Rates 
                                               
129
 Costas Lapavitsas -Crisis in the Eurozone (p.13) Fig. 1 GDP Growth Rates 
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Source: Eurostat 
 
 There is an obvious link that the periphery countries show bigger rates of growth than 
the levels of growth of Germany. The problem is the balance of payments. The balance of 
payments is into the economic equation [E-X] that is the levels of import – the levels of 
export. To avoid balance of payments deficit there it is important the export or the import 
does not goes upper. Both should be in balance otherwise there is unbalance in 
productivity that brings changes into the wage differentials and in a situation of crisis if a 
country has a high balance of payments deficit that brings high level of unemployment 
high level of in-debt-ness of the citizens and GDP anomalies or the economy experience 
strong demand shocks. That partly explains the reason why the countries into periphery 
are not as competitive as the Germans are. High wages, high inflation, huge balance of 
payments deficit, and huge foreign debt- these factors bring a country to a recession.  
  
The crisis put into a question two of the most basic characteristics of the welfare state in 
its European perspective – the generosity and the universality in addition to the 
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connection between the migrants and so called system of a social safety.  During the 
crisis peak 2008-2009 data base from Eurostat discusses that for the EU-27 “the analysis 
for the employment index shows strong falls in the index in the Baltic Member States, but 
again the greatest impact on the EU-27 index is from Spain. The Spanish employment 
index in construction fell 32.7 % between the first quarter of 2008 and the last quarter of 
2009, in comparison to 12.1 % for the EU-27 as a whole. The weighted rate of change in 
Spain was equivalent to about three fifths of the overall fall in the EU-27 construction 
employment index.”130 That means that the crisis reflects negatively the employment 
rates in most countries. “Between the second quarters of 2008 and 2009 services turnover 
fell by 11.4 % in the EU-27. The magnitude of the fall was due almost entirely to the 16.4 
% reduction in wholesale trades and the 15.5 % fall in motor trades and to a lesser extent 
the 3.8 % fall in retail trade … Other activities recorded larger falls in turnover, such as -
22.7 % for employment services, but their lower weight resulted in a smaller impact on 
the total services turnover index. Since the second quarter of 2008 the EU-27 services 
employment index has fallen by 3.6 %, and by the last quarter of 2009 was still on a 
downward path.”131  
 
The negative impact of the crisis over the economic condition on the EU population 
exposes, as well, and the data for the financial wealth of the households. This is showed 
by the Eurostat data for Net financial wealth of households:  
 
„In almost all countries the first year of the financial crisis led to the reduction of stocks 
of net household financial assets as a percentage of their disposable income. ...A 
significant part of this decrease was due to the downturn of financial markets. …Net 
financial wealth was smaller in 2008 than in 2000 for most countries… The decrease in 
net financial assets can be explained either by an increase in liabilities or by a decrease in 
assets…”132 
                                               
130 Eurostat Employment in Europe, 2010: p. 44 
131 Eurostat Employment in Europe: 2010:  p.6. 
132 Ismael Zarco. Net financial wealth of households fell during the opening phase of the financial crisis in 
the EU. Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, 33/2010, p.1-2.  
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4.2.2.2. Migration flows: Europe and the consequences from the crisis 
 
In this part there are some statistical examples used in order to illustrate the correlation 
between the crisis as a push and a pull factor for migration flows. The first example is 
from Eurostat statistical database. Table 2 bellow illustrated the statistics for the 
migration flows to the separate EU member-states and part of the EFTA countries. This 
table is a good example of the correlation between the financial and economic crisis and 
the migration flows. As it could be clearly seen from the exposed data in the situation of 
the so called “PIGS” countries that are seriously hit by the crisis. The migration flows to 
these countries suddenly devaluates and there could be observed quite the opposite to the 
direction of the migration flows to the countries that are economically stable even in a 
situation of a crisis. The migration flows to the last increases.  
 
The same correlation could be observed in the countries part of EFTA. For example 
Iceland, that is hit by the seriously by the crisis experience a recent stop of the migration 
flows and quite the opposite could be said about Norway as a country with stable 
economy. This is an example of how the crisis could be understood as push and pull 
factor over the migration flows. Denmark from the economically stabled countries in a 
situation of a crisis is not an exception. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-10-033/EN/KS-SF-10-033-EN.PDF 
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Table 2. Comparison of immigration by sex, age and broad group of citizenship.
133
   
 
AGE: Total CITIZEN: Total SEX: Total 
Time 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
GEO           
EU (27        1,609,20
0(i) 
1,747,80
0(i) 
1,671,
500(i) 
Belgium 113,857 112,060 117,23
6 
132,81
0 
137,699 146,40
9 
: 164,152 131,235(
b) 
144,69
8 
Bulgaria : : : : : 1,561 1,236 : : : 
Czech 
Republic 
 44,679   60,015   
53,453 
  
60,294 
  68,183 104,44
5 
108,267
(b) 
  75,620   48,317   
27,114 
Denmark   52,778   49,754   
49,860 
  
52,458 
  56,750   
64,656 
  
57,357(
b) 
  51,800   52,236   
52,833 
Germany 842,543 768,975 780,17
5 
707,35
2 
661,855 680,76
6 
682,146 346,216(
b) 
404,055 489,42
2 
Estonia        575        967     
1,097 
    
1,436 
    2,234     
3,741 
    
3,671(b) 
    3,884     2,810     
3,709 
Ireland   61,725   58,875   
78,075 
102,00
0 
103,260   
88,779 
  63,927   37,409   39,525   
52,301 
Greece : : : : : : : : 119,070 110,82
3 
Spain 483,260 672,266
(b) 
684,56
1 
719,28
4 
840,844 958,26
6 
726,009 498,977 465,168 457,64
9 
France : 236,037 225,62
9 
219,53
7 
219,407 209,78
1 
216,937 : 251,159(
b) 
267,36
7(p) 
Italy 222,801 470,491 444,56
6 
325,67
3 
297,640 558,01
9 
534,712
(p) 
442,940(
p) 
458,856 385,79
3 
Cyprus   14,370   16,779   
22,003 
  
24,419 
  15,545   
19,017 
  14,095   11,675   20,206   
23,037 
Latvia     1,428     1,364     
1,665 
    
1,886 
    2,801     
3,541 
    3,465     2,688     
2,364(p) 
    
7,253(
b) 
Lithuania     5,110     4,728     
5,553 
    
6,789 
    7,745     
8,609 
    9,297     6,487     5,213    
15,685 
Luxembou
rg 
  12,101    
13,158 
  
12,872 
  
14,397 
  14,352   
16,675 
  17,758    15,751    16,962    
20,268 
Hungary   19,855    
21,327 
  
24,298 
  
27,820 
25,732(
p) 
  
24,361 
  
37,652(
b) 
  27,894 : : 
Malta        533 : :     
187(p) 
  
1,829(e
 
6,730(
    9,031     7,230      8,201      
5,522 
                                               
133
 Last update: 13.03.13 Source of data: Eurostat 
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) e) 
Netherland
s 
121,250 104,514   
94,019 
  
92,297 
101,150 116,81
9 
143,516 128,813(
bp) 
: : 
Austria 108,125
(b) 
111,869 122,54
7 
114,46
5 
  98,535 106,65
9 
110,074   
73,278(b) 
   73,863 104,35
4 
Poland     
6,587(i) 
    
7,048(i) 
  
9,495(i
) 
  
9,364(i
) 
10,802(
i) 
14,995
(i) 
  
47,880(
b) 
: : :(p) 
Portugal   
79,300(
p) 
  
72,400(
p) 
57,920
(p) 
49,200
(p) 
38,800(
p) 
46,300
(p) 
  
29,718(
p) 
   
32,307(p) 
   
27,575(p) 
  
19,667
(p) 
Romania : : : : : : : : : :(p) 
Slovenia     9,134      
9,279 
  
10,171 
  
15,041 
  20,016   
29,193 
  
30,693(
b) 
   30,296     15,416    
14,083 
Slovakia     2,312    
6,551(bi
) 
  
10,390 
    
9,410 
  12,611   
16,265 
  17,820    15,643     13,770      
4,829 
Finland    
18,113 
   
17,838 
  
20,333 
  
21,355 
  22,451   
26,029 
  29,114    26,699     25,636     
29,481 
Sweden    
64,087 
   
63,795 
  
62,028 
  
65,229 
  95,750   
99,485 
 
101,171 
 102,280     98,801     
96,467 
United 
Kingdom 
 
385,901 
 
431,487 
518,09
7 
496,47
0 
529,008
(i) 
526,71
4 
590,242
(b) 
566,514(i
) 
  
590,950(i
) 
  
566,04
4 
Iceland      
4,215 
    
3,704(i) 
  
5,350(i
) 
  
7,773(i
) 
    9,832   
12,546 
  10,288     
3,921(b) 
      3,948       
4,073 
Liechtenst
ein 
: : : : : :        578        584          591          
650 
Norway    
40,122 
   
35,957 
  
36,482 
  
40,148 
  45,776   
61,774 
  
58,123(
b) 
   55,953     69,214     
70,337 
Switzerlan
d 
126,080 119,783 120,18
8 
118,27
0 
127,586 165,63
4 
184,297  160,623   161,778   
148,79
9 
 
 
 
 
Another research of the International Organization for Migration examines with statistical 
data precisely the relationship between the crisis and the migration flows that could be 
used to support the suggested hypothesis that the crisis is an important push and pull 
factor for a migration. 
 60 
 
To the represented table bellow
134
 could be observed that the migration flows in Europe 
to the economically stable countries is quite equally distributed. Into the Scandinavian 
countries could be observed that the migrants coming from non-EU countries are still 
with high levels. That could be explained with the large numbers of asylum seekers that 
are attracted from the Scandinavian generous model of welfare, as well as the crisis that 
hit seriously the USA, as well.   The situation in Ireland is quite the opposite as could be 
seen from the next graph market as Graph 2
135
  and it could be seen a relation between 
the situation before and after the crisis boom. After 2007 there is a recent decrease of the 
net-migration to Ireland that was immigrant-receiving country before the crisis. After the 
crisis put the risk of the migration on higher level of the migration flows reduced their 
number.  
 
To summarize the crisis looked as push and pull factor has two sides. The crisis as a push 
factor make people in unstable economically countries that react negatively on crisis hits 
and are more odd to experience asymmetric demand shocks to migrate to countries with 
stable economies that are resistant to crisis hits. The last could be seen a crisis as a pull 
factor for those economically strong countries. The crisis is as push factor for migration 
for one countries and a pull for other. These lines of thoughts lead us slowly to the 
discussion about the welfare magnet as a pull factor that is another red tread for the 
analytical framework of this project. 
                                               
134 IMO Migration and the economics crisis in the European Union: Implications for Policy 2010; p. 16 
135 Ibid. 
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Graph1 
    
 
Graph 2: 
 
 
 
4.3. The Danish Welfare State Model as a magnet for migration to Denmark 
 
Some authors have the vision that “Denmark is facing the challenge of an ageing 
population and the consequences of increasing immigration.”136 and they explain it with 
this that “the Danish universal welfare state, which includes a rather compressed wage 
                                               
136 ibid 
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structure and high welfare benefits, requires a broad tax base and a relatively low 
dependency ratio to be sustainable”137 and that “the immigrant population is relatively 
low-skilled as a result of the migration policies in place and the fact that immigrants are 
attracted more by existing networks than by welfare magnet effects.”138 This argumend 
defence the wage differential motive as a push and pull factor and puts into a 
concideration the welfare magnet hypothesis. Following the same idea the further 
explanation comes with that the “immigrants therefore tend to be difficult to integrate in 
the labour market, making them more welfare-dependent than the natives. Denmark’s 
policy focus is consequently on raising the labour market participation of immigrants in 
order to help meet Denmark’s long-term fiscal challenges”.139 Here as an argument is 
used the hypothesis of the so called “fiscal drain” that assumes that the immigrants that 
are attracted to a country with as a concequence of the welfare magnet pull factor become 
a fiscal burdain for the welfare state, because of their uncapability to find job or their aim 
to take maximum advantage of the welfare benefits that the system is offering.  This 
vision also supports the “fears that the immigrants are fiscal drain”140 and “the increasing 
concerns that the welfare state generosity works as a social magnet to immigrants”141  
 
The historical perspective of the development of the Danish welfare in terms of migration 
flows and the change of the immigration politics is seen into details into the article of 
Ana Claudia Alfieri and Jens Matthiessen. Here are underlined the features of the history 
of the migration processes in Denmark and “the fact that immigrants are attracted more 
by existing networks than by welfare magnet effects”. That means that there is a focus 
over the fact that the established immigration structure and the features of the migrations 
to Denmark into the past give more importance to the factor “existing networks” than 
“the welfare magnet factor”.  The hypothesis that is exposed from the authors here is that 
the structure of the existing migration networks to Denmark are influenced more from the 
existing networks than from the welfare magnet factor. That puts in doubts the strength of 
                                               
137 Ana Claudia Alfieri and Jens Matthiessen. ECFIN Country Focus. Volume 2, Issue 19, 02.12.2005 
138 ibid 
139 ibid 
140 Migration Policy and the Generosity of the welfare state in Europe; Assaf Rezin and Jackline Wahna; 
p.28 
141Rezin and Wahba: p. 28 
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the magnet factor hypothesis, but it cannot be denied that welfare structures as the Danish 
one are more attractive to immigrants than other welfare structural models, because of its 
higher benefits or generosity and universalism. The same author sees the demographic 
challenges in front of the welfare state structures and tries to explain the path-dependency 
between the migration flows, welfare benefits and welfare legacy challenges. The idea 
exposed here is that „like most European countries, Denmark is facing the challenge of 
an ageing population. The projected ageing is leading to a substantial increase in the 
number of retirees and to a shrinking working-age population, which constrains future 
labour supply and risks slowing down economic growth. Under the present welfare 
system, public expenditure will increase as the share of dependent persons grows. The 
funding of publicly financed goods and services in Denmark is universal, i.e. everybody 
contributes to the system by paying taxes. As the level of the transfers and the quality of 
the services are high, the system requires a broad tax base and a low dependency ratio to 
be sustainable.”142 That is one of the possible explanations that in terms of the welfare the 
role of the immigrants is going to increase in meaning of importance of supporting all the 
social system mainly, because of the structure of the migrants as it is shown in working 
age and aimed into the particular labor market fields and naturally with the help of 
supplying the welfare state system.  Here is exposed one of the most important features of 
the Danish Immigration politics – to which groups of immigrants are pointed the 
restrictions – education, profession, age, gender and other – to which groups are pointed 
the less restrictions in meaning of migration.
143
 
 
From the above exposed arguments could be exposed also the idea that in a situation of a 
crisis the „Denmark’s strategy in preparing for the effects of ageing is based on debt 
reduction, combined with measures increasing the labour supply by raising participation 
rates. 
 
With the room for manoeuvre limited, since the country already has one of the highest 
employment rates in the EU, a part of the challenge for the sustainability of public 
                                               
142 ibid 
143 ibid 
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finances is to raise employment in segments of the population which tend to have lower 
employment rates” 144 Here is very important to be berried in mind that the aging as a 
factor is important in terms of importance of the migration. When there is an aging 
population in a country it is very important to be led better social and migration policies 
in the country in order to be attracted more labor force from abroad that could provide the 
benefits needed for the part of the population that is nor able to work. The aging 
population is in general a problem for all the European countries. More immigrants does 
not mean solving that problem, because there as well as mentioned earlier cultural and 
linguistic barriers for integration of the newcomers could be a factor that has a negative 
effect over the migration from one area to another.  
 
According to the official reports of the European Commission (in 2004) “8 percent of the 
Danish population are immigrants (and in 2012 the level is already up to 11%) and the 
overall employment rate of the immigrant population is similar to that elsewhere in 
Europe, at 51 per cent compared to 54 per cent in the EU-15. However, the labour market 
participation of non-Western immigrants is markedly lower than that of native Danes, 
and their welfare dependency thus higher. These two phenomena are closely intertwined 
and their effects will increasingly weigh on public finances as this group becomes a 
larger part of the working-age population. For Denmark, immigrants are thus a pocket of 
potential labour supply. 
145
 This supports the previous argumentation that the migrants 
are needed into the welfare system in order to keep it as such. Therefore are needed 
stronger and better immigration policies, so these migration flows could be controlled in 
order to serve the welfare instead of being a welfare burden or “welfare drain”.146 In that 
consideration the exposed argument above is good to be used when there is a discussion 
of the variables that point the crisis-driven migration to Denmark and the clash between 
the “welfare magnet and the fiscal drain”147.   
 
5. Statistics 
                                               
144 (European Commission, 2004). 
145 European Commission 2004 
146 Razin Wahba expression 
147 Razin wahba expression 
 65 
 
In the empirical part of the analysis there are few variables that are taken into 
consideration with the purpose to be examined the unemployment levels first in Europe, 
so it could be given an illustration of the unemployment levels after the crisis and if the 
crisis is a strong push factor for migration because of a situation of high levels of 
unemployment in a certain affected country, or there are other stronger push factors for a 
migration than unemployment. There is as well a statistical data exposed in terms of to be 
examined the pull factors for immigration of citizens from certain areas to Denmark. The 
statistics clearly shows that the welfare benefits are a pull or a magnet factor for citizens 
from certain European countries, and that there is bigger immigration flow from outside 
Europe, because of government politics of attracting more skilled labor force and 
improving certain economic sectors. This politics have a lot to do with the European 
Union Strategy plan 2020 and the different economic plans to get Europe faster recovered 
from the economic crisis. 
 
Main variables that will be taken into a consideration are the increase of unemployment 
rates as a consequence of the crisis and the recession in the targeted countries. The main 
argument variable used will be the migration flows direction to Denmark in order to be 
seen the path-dependency between the migration waves and the policy decision-making 
in Denmark and how does that affects the welfare magnet pull factor of the Danish model 
of social-democratic welfare system.  
 
The structure of the migration waves to Denmark on the base of the resident permits 
according to the Danish migration Services statistical data exposed (see Appendix 2) 
there are four times more numbers of the work permits in the period 2004 to 2008, 
including the EU/EEA residence certificates to wage earners. That implements that there 
might be a relation between the changes into the Dansih legislation and the crisis burst 
that creates increase of the immigrants seeking work in secured economically and 
politically structure as Denmark.  The crisis relation is quite clear into the following 
statement of the Danish migration service report that „the number of residence permits 
increased significantly in 2008. In the area of migration and asylum, a total number of 
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69.277 permits were granted, compared to 58.569 permits in 2007 – an increase of 
approximately 11.000 permits, or 18 percent.”148 According to the same source “the 
largest nationalities in 2008 were (in persons): Poland (15.300), Germany (4.668), China 
(4.492), Ukraine (3.805), USA (3.061) and India (3.008).”149 The increase of the IT 
specialist from India is in a relation with a special Danish politics of opening more 
working places for IT specialist from this area that is coordinated with the business cycle. 
According to the Danish migration service’s statistics the “overall, there has been a 
quadruple in the number of granted work permits etc. – inclusive EU/EEA residence 
certificates to wage-earners, from 2004 to 2008”, which is shown in the overview 
Appendix 1. According to the same source “there is an increase in the number of 
foreigners coming to Denmark in 2008 for the purpose of work. According to the 
statistical data of the Danish immigration service in 2008 there is “a significant” increase 
of the work residents permits among the foreigners. As a whole there are 30.475 permits, 
or increase with 17% in comparison with 2007. The increase is because of the permits 
that are given to EU citizens. The bigest number of permits are given to citizens from 
countries as Poland (12.193), Germany (2.102), Romania (1.758) and Lithuania 
(1.685).”150 These data exposed is also an evidence for the hypothetical relation between 
the crisis as a push factor and the Danish welfare magnet as pull factor. The Dansih law 
allows equal rights of the EU citizens and Danish citizens. That is in a relation with one 
of the basic principles of the social democratic welfare system model the principle of 
equality and universalism. With the crisis damaging more and more European countries 
economy in that relation Germany as well increases and the migration to more secure and 
stable systems as the Danish one that guarantee job and social security. Further data from 
the same source points that “the increase in the number of permits granted to foreigners 
coming to Denmark to work increased significantly in 2008. In total, a number of 30.475 
residence permits were issued for the purpose of work, an increase of about 17 percent 
compared to 2007. The increase is especially due to an increase in the permits granted to 
persons from the EU Member States. The 5 largest nationalities in 2008 in the area of 
work were (in persons): Poland (12.193), Germany (2.102), India (1.934), Romania 
                                               
148 Danish immigration service 
149 Danish immigration Service 
150 Danish Immigration Service 
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(1.758) and Lithuania (1.685).”151 It is important to be noticed here that the explanation 
for these numbers could be also other than the crisis as already have been mentioned in 
the project the reasons for many migrants coming from areas as Germany, Romania, 
Poland Lithuania could be another factor family reunification as a consequence of 
previous politics that has been led from the state of Denmark. No matter of these facts 
there is an obvious increase in the percentages exactly in the intensive crisis period that 
pushes into my mind the argument that there is a connection between the increased 
migration levels and the crisis as a push factor. In the period of 2011 there have been 
some reforms invented and changes in the residence permits rates. According to the same 
source “the number of residence permits, etc. decreased slightly in 2011 compared to 
2010. In 2011 a total number of 57.787 permits were granted, compared to 59.019 
permits in 2010. The largest nationalities in 2011 were: Poland (5.129), USA (3.999), 
Romania (3.802), Germany (3.287) and China (3.096).”152 The increase in the immigrants 
requires from citizens of USA has interesting path-dependency with the crisis 
consequences in these countries in terms of increased unemployment, insecurity and 
lowering of welfare benefits. Another more made here from the agency is that “almost 
half of the granted permits in 2011 concerned registration certificates and residence cards 
issued to EU/EEA citizens.”153 
 
To year 2011 the Danish statistics shows that “the number of residence permits, etc. 
decreased slightly in 2011 compared to 2010. In 2011 a total number of 57.787 permits 
were granted, compared to 59.019 permits in 2010. The largest nationalities in 2011 
were: Poland (5.129), USA (3.999), Romania (3.802), Germany (3.287) and China 
(3.096). Almost half of the granted permits in 2011 concerned registration certificates and 
residence cards issued to EU/EEA citizens.”154  
 
                                               
151. Danish Immigration Service. Statistical Overview. Migration and Asylum. 2009, p. 2 
 http://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/B219C8ED-CF9C-4C11-8ECF-
81E6C2898B90/0/StatisticalOverview2008.pdf 
152 Danish Immigration Service 
153 Danish Immigration Service 
154 Justice Minesteriet Statistical Overview 
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An illustration of the path dependency between the immigration policies and directing of 
the migration flows is the data provided from the Justice Ministry (because of the 
reconstruction in to the institutions in the Danish state) that show that there are more 
permits under the so called Pay Limit Scheme. The statistics points that “the number of 
granted permits under the Pay Limit Scheme increased by about 20 percent, from 1.863 
in 2010 to 2.233 in 2011. The total number of highly educated foreigners who have been 
granted permission to work in Denmark as part of the Schemes under the Job Plan, etc. 
was down from 5.395 permits in 2010 to 4.280 permits in 2011 -mainly because of 1.667 
fewer permits granted according to the Greencard Scheme. Approximately 40 percent of 
all granted permits as part of the Schemes under the Job Plan, etc. were granted to 
persons from India. The number of granted permits to other wage-earners and self-
employed decreased from 2.575 permits in 2010 to 2.050 permits in 2011.
155
 These data 
illustrates that there is a try from the Danish government to reduce the level of unskilled 
workers into the welfare system and increase the number of the educated and skilled 
workers that are as well tax-payers and help the welfare, benefit the welfare. That is quite 
the opposite with the unskilled workers. As already mentioned the experience is that they 
are hard to integrate and there is a bigger competition when it comes to jobs because 
there is a limit of jobs they can take and that creates higher levels of unemployment into 
these immigrant groups that makes them more welfare dependent than the qualified 
workers as IT experts can be for example. The social democratic welfare model is a 
welfare pull magnet factor for refugees and unskilled workers but with the new 
legislative reforms as could be seen from this statistical data there is a hypothetical try 
from the Dansih government to change the magnitude of the welfare as a pull factor for 
immigrants from poorer areas or not so developed economically countries as some of the 
Central European and South European countries are. These measures are crucial in a 
situation of a recession because they are tools to reduce unemployment, keep the 
                                               
155 Justits Ministeriet. Statistical Overview. Migration and Asylum. 2012, p.2  
http://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/0BF1EFD8-53EF-49F2-858A-
518A0F48ABB7/0/extract_statistical_overview_migration_asylum_2011.pdf 
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domestic labor market in balance and protect the welfare from abuse of the welfare 
benefits.  
 
The data for 2010-2011 shows in relation with the crisis followed migration waves that 
the “EU/EEA citizens -increase in the number of labor migrants. The number of 
residence cards and registration certificates issued to EU/EEA citizens increased from 
25.361 in 2010 to 27.395 in 2011. The increase is seen in the number of registration 
certificates issued for the purpose of work, which increased from 10.560 in 2010 to 
11.673 in 2011 -mainly on account of registration certificates to citizens of Poland, 
Romania and Lithuania. The number of registration certificates issued for the purpose of 
study is largely unchanged, 8.954 certificates were issued in 2010 compared to 9.034 
certificates in 2011”.156 
 
According to some authors one of the explanations of the migration meaning of the 
magnet hypothesis or welfare dependency, or pull factor, for example is the comparison 
between the expenditures of the social systems, e.g. what are the social spending for a 
person as a percentage of the GDP that is keeping alive this social system.
157
 
 
According to the same source “there are significant differences between countries in the 
level of per capita expenditure on social protection.”158  The data exposed shows that “in 
2000 per capita social protection expenditure was 6 604 PPS in the EU-27 and 8 108 PPS 
in the euro area .”159  Further the research shows “as for expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP (statistical data should be presented), there are also pronounced differences between 
countries in expenditure per capita. Of all the EU countries, Luxembourg had the highest 
expenditure in 2008 (14 057 PPS per capita), followed by the Netherlands and Sweden 
(with  more than 9 000 PPS per capita). The values for the countries with the largest per 
capita expenditure (Luxembourg excluded) were roughly six to eight times the values in 
the group of EU countries with the lowest expenditure, i.e. Bulgaria, Romania and Latvia 
                                               
156 Ibid., p.2. 
157 Ministry of Justice Overview 
158 Ibid 
159 ibid 
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(with values between 1 661 and 1 803 PPS per capita). Of the countries outside the EU-
27 expenditure is highest in Norway (10 642 PPS), surpassed only by Luxembourg. 
Differences between countries in terms of the level of expenditure are partly related to 
differing levels of wealth, but they also reflect diversity in social protection systems, 
demographic trends, unemployment rates and other social, institutional and economic 
factors.”160  
 
In that relation it is good to look over the public income transfers. Good example is figure 
2.1 represented by Blume K.,Verner M. on p. 2 in her work “Welfare Dependency 
Among Danish Immigrants: 
 
 
                                               
160 Antonella Puglia. In 2008 gross expenditure on social protection in EU-27 accounted for 26.4 % of 
GDP. Eurostat, Statistic in Focus, 17/2011, p.2. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-
SF-11-017/EN/KS-SF-11-017-EN.PDF 
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From Figure 2.1, it is seen that direct public income transfers account for between 16.3% 
and 21.2% of GDP in the period 1984-1999. Furthermore, it can be seen that the fraction 
of GDP attributed to direct transfers mimics the business cycle almost perfectly when the 
business cycle is described by the unemployment rate.  
 
Appendix A1 describes in more detail the different transfer types which are included in 
the analysis in the present paper along with a description of whether the individual 
transfers re-quire entitlements, have limited durations and/or whether they are means-
tested. In general, in the Danish welfare state the universal principle applies. Hence, 
immigrants have the same rights as natives when it comes to receiving public income 
transfers, with a few exceptions. As a general rule, immigrants need to have been in 
Denmark for at least 10 years to receive early retirement pension and old-age pension 
(except for refugees and the early labor migrants).
161
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Massey explains that the international migration of workers is caused by differences in 
wage rates between countries; the elimination of wage differentials will end the 
movement of labor, and migration will not occur in the absence of such differentials; 
International flows of human capital-that is, highly skilled workers- respond to 
differences in the rate of return to human capital, which may be different from the overall 
wage rate, yielding a distinct pattern of migration that may be opposite that of unskilled 
workers; Labor markets are the primary mechanisms by which international flows of 
labor are induced; other kinds of markets do not have important effects on international 
migration; The way for governments to control migration flows is to regulate or influence 
labor markets in sending and/or receiving countries. 
162
 These words to large extend 
explain some of the main strains that are a pulling force for the international migration 
mobility.  
                                               
161 Blume: p.3 
162 Massey: 434 
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The wage differentials point the labor migration from lower-waged or not so 
economically developed countries to high-waged and more developed countries. The 
different economical situation and the higher levels of social protection create usual 
stream of migration flows from the East to the West and from the South to the North. In a 
situation of financial and economic crisis the countries from the South that have 
developed too generous welfare systems and are still not so economically stable, because 
of wrongly managed politics are experiencing higher level of unemployment and have 
been dragged into a deep recessions. Part of the reason why these countries are in worse 
situation is that their welfare states were too generous in terms of social benefits. Because 
of the boom of GDP and the high wages countries like Greece and Spain were 
immigrant-receiving countries for a long period of time. Most of the migrants were 
unskilled workers that created a condition of many immigrants on their territories that 
only benefiting from the welfare without contributing to it. With the hit of the crisis their 
weakened economies collapsed.  Through the empirical evidence exposed earlier in the 
work there has been observed a migration flow decrease after the crisis boom in 2008 
from countries like Ireland for example that used to be immigrant receiving countries and 
an increase of the migration flows to the countries like the Scandinavian one with strong 
economies and low social risk. This relevance undermines the crisis as a push and pull 
factor and clearly exposes the role of the crisis as such.  
 
Another directing factor for the migration flows is the so called welfare magnet factor or 
a factor of attraction. The Scandinavian model of welfare has very strong magnet because 
of the high social benefits, high wages, universalism, equality and generosity. The system 
itself tends to attract more unskilled workers and is very welcoming to asylum seekers. 
These factors put the welfare on a risk. The same risks as the countries from the PIGS 
region are facing now. The unskilled workers are competing in one sector of the labor 
market that creates a shortage of domestic labor demand for it. In order to protect its 
domestic labor market and its own citizens the Danish government is taking initiatives to 
reconstruct the immigrant configuration in the country by providing new schemes for 
attracting skilled migrants that are the assed of financing through taxes the welfare 
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structure. From previous experience the Danish governors know that immigration 
policies matter and they work. Good example for balancing the welfare is the reduce of 
the number of asylum seekers in Denmark that was a protectionist politics, because of the 
large numbers of these type of migrants that were targeting the country. The problem 
with these groups of migrants is that they hardly integrate into the Danish society and 
most of them are even illiterate that increases the competition for unskilled jobs.     
   
In order to answer the question: to what extend the “push” and the “pull” factors of 
migration flows to Denmark are influenced by the financial and economic crisis into the 
period 2008-2012? I would conclude that the crisis itself is a push and pull factor at the 
same time for the migration flows to Denmark. The last increased more after the crisis. 
Besides the crisis pull, the higher wages and better opportunity for job, it is important to 
mention that welfare itself is a magnet pull factor with the provision of high social 
benefits, limitation of the social risk and better opportunities to be employed, because of 
its stability and wise management of the integration and immigration policies. 
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Appendix 1 
 
L. Kurekova: Overview of theories of migration 
 
Theory Subject of 
analysis 
Levels of 
analysis 
Pet variable(s) Critique 
Neoclassical 
theory of 
migration 
 
 
 
 
 
Determinants 
of migration 
Macro  
Micro 
Wage and 
income 
differentials 
Probability of 
employment 
Mechanically reduces 
migration 
determinants – 
exclusion of politics 
and policies.   
Assume linearity – 
unable to explain 
differential migration, 
why people do not 
move, or why 
migration ceases 
before wage 
differentials equalize. 
Homogenization of 
migrants and 
societies. 
Static perspective. 
Human capital 
theory of 
migration 
Micro Wages, 
economic 
benefits 
affected by 
individual 
characteristics 
Overly optimistic 
(functionalist) view – 
migration is not 
always a voluntary 
process to maximize 
gains. 
New economic 
theory of 
migration 
Micro 
Mezzo 
Wages and 
income 
distribution 
(relative 
deprivation) 
Institutional 
failure – 
credit market, 
labor market 
deficiencies 
Critique of the 
neoclassical theory 
rather than a theory in 
its own right. 
Sending side bias. 
Limited applicability 
– difficult to isolate 
the effect of market 
imperfections and risk 
in migration decisions 
from other income 
and employment 
variables.  
World system 
theory 
(historical-
structural 
Macro: global 
and 
international 
processes 
Structural 
changes 
induced by 
the flow of 
Only applicable at the 
global level. 
Explanations 
formulated ex ante, 
 80 
approach) capital cannot be empirically 
tested.  
Dual labor 
market theory  
Macro: 
Nation state 
Mezzo 
Labor demand 
Bifurcation of 
labor market 
FDI 
State 
immigration 
policies and 
recruitment 
efforts 
Receiving state bias – 
excludes push factors, 
formal recruitment 
practices 
overemphasized.  
Unable to account for 
differential 
immigration rates in 
different advanced 
economies with 
similar economic 
structure. 
Distinction between 
primary and 
secondary sectors is 
usually arbitrary 
which leads to 
instability in 
empirical estimates. 
Network theory  
Perpetuation 
of migration 
and/or 
directionality 
of flow 
 
Mezzo Networks, 
diaspora 
Conceptual 
framework rather than 
theory. 
Migration 
system theory 
Macro Development 
space 
Purely descriptive. 
Transnational 
migration 
Transnational 
level 
Transnational 
social spaces 
Novelty of the 
concepts has been 
questioned. 
Research within this 
paradigm usually 
selects on dependant 
variables. 
 
Source: Based mainly on Arango, 2000, Massey et all, 1998, and de Haas, 2008.  
 
 
 
 
Appendix A1. Public income transfers  
Income replacing public income transfers: 
 
Transfer  Explanation  Characteristics  
 81 
Public pensions  Old-age pension, early 
retirement pension etc. Old-
age pension is paid to 
individuals aged more than 
65 years. Consists of 2 
amounts. The base-payment 
(fixed amount paid to all 
who are entitled, i.e. above 
65 years old) and a 
supplementary payment 
(means-tested).  
Universal, partly fixed 
amount and partly means-
tested, infinite duration  
Pension paid to former civil 
servants  
Special labour market 
related pension paid to indi-
viduals who are formerly 
employed in the public 
sector as a civil servant.  
Entitlement requirements, 
fixed amount, infinite 
duration  
Public welfare  Different kinds of public 
welfare.  
Universal, means-tested, 
infinite duration  
Unemployment insurance 
benefits (I)  
Unemployment insurance 
benefits. Paid by the 
unemployment insurance 
organizations.  
Entitlement requirements, 
fixed amount, finite 
duration  
Unemployment insurance 
benefits (II)  
Unemployment insurance 
benefits in case of illness 
etc. Paid by the local 
governments.  
Entitlement requirements, 
fixed amount, finite 
duration  
Education support (I)  Financial support to people 
who undertake education. 
Paid by the state.  
Entitlement requirements, 
fixed amount, finite 
duration  
Education support (II)  Financial support to 
unemployed people who 
un-dertake education. Paid 
by the unemployment in-
surance organizations.  
Entitlement requirements, 
fixed amount, finite 
duration  
Public self-employment 
sup-port  
Financial support to 
individuals who start out as 
self-employed.  
Entitlement requirements, 
fixed amount, finite 
duration  
 
Other public income transfers: 
 
Transfer  Explanation  Characteristics  
Child benefit  Quarterly subsidy paid to 
households with children. 
Fixed amount, universal, 
conditional of children’s 
 82 
Dependent on the number 
of children.  
age  
Public housing support  Paid to individuals who 
live in rental housing.  
Means-tested, infinite 
duration  
 
Appendix 2 
Overview of all residence permits, etc. granted in Denmark 2003 - 2009
163
 
Category 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 % in 
2008 
2009 % in 
2009 
Work (A)  4.240 5.581 8.915 15.396 21.440 12.638 18% 9.168 16% 
- of which Job Card Scheme 
/Job Plan 
399 447 609 900 1.745 2.624 4% 3.616 6% 
- of which specialists, etc.  262 287 332 450 314 144 < 1%  15 < 1%  
- of which wage-earner and self-
employed 
1.663 1.469 1.513 1.849 3.464 3.109 4% 2.897 5% 
- of which work permits to 
persons from the new EU 
Member States 
 2.097 4.923 10.353 13.773 4.459 6% 292 < 1% 
Study, etc. (B)  12.538 14.306 16.073 13.052 16.083 20.235 29% 16.837 30% 
- of which education 6.122 6.221 6.854 5.043 6.031 7.358 11% 6.145 11% 
- of which au pair 1.417 1.537 1.916 2.620 3.221 3.142 5% 2.160 4% 
- of which interns 1.233 1.500 1.471 1.793 2.207 2.937 4% 2.773 5% 
EU/EEA (C) 6.475 7.904 9.916 12.802 14.620 30.544 44% 24.305 43% 
- of which wage-earner 2.129 2.147 2.516 3.684 4.532 17.837 26% 11.019 19% 
- of which education 2.550 3.815 4.593 5.753 5.996 6.817 10% 7.974 14% 
                                               
163 Danish Immigration Service. Statistical Overview. Migration and Asylum. 2009, p. 3 
and Danish Immigration Service. Statistical Overview. Migration and Asylum. 2010, p.4 
(http://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/B219C8ED-CF9C-4C11-8ECF-
81E6C2898B90/0/StatisticalOverview2008.pdf 
and 
http://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/BB2D6CAE-E0E0-4210-BA14-
EB5822253DDE/0/StatisticalOverview2009.pdf) 
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- of which to family members of 
an EU/EEA national 
867 924 1.642 1.941 2.980 4.773 7% 3.824 7% 
Family reunification, etc. (D) 5.733 4.718 4.341 4.198 5.148 4.407 7% 5.211 9% 
Family reunification * 4.791 3.832 3.522 3.582 4.454 3.749 6% 4.479 8% 
of which spouses and 
cohabitants 
2.538 2.344 2.498 2.787 3.616 3.071 4% 3.662 6% 
Other residence cases 942 886 819 616 694 658 1% 732 1% 
Asylum, etc. ** (E) 2.447 1.592 1.147 1.095 1.278 1.453 2% 1.376 2% 
Refugee status ** 1.852 1.045 853 838 1.013 1.242 2% 1.279 2% 
- of which Geneva Convention 724 278 167 201 70 311 < 1% 414 < 1% 
- of which B-status/De facto-
status ** 
602 229 202 107 403 367 1% 413 < 1% 
- of which quota refugees 509 498 483 530 472 564 1% 452 < 1% 
Other status 595 547 294 257 265 211 < 1% 97 < 1% 
- of which humanitarian 
residence permits 
203 351 186 216 223 157 < 1% 55 < 1% 
Total (A+B+C+D+E) 31.433 34.101 40.392 46.543 58.569 69.277 100% 56.897 100% 
Total number of work 
permits, etc. (third 
countryand EU/EEA-
nationals (category A + under 
category C)) 
 
6.369 
 
7.728 
 
11.431 
 
19.080 
 
25.972 
 
30.475 
 
44% 
  
 
* Including permits for family reunification to a Danish citizen according to the EU rules. 
** Including 308 permits (B-status) to Iraqi interpreters etc. in 2007 and 83 in 2008. 
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Table 2 
 
Overview of all residence permits, etc. granted in Denmark 2006 - 2011
164
 
 
Category 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010* 2011 % in 
2011 
Work (A)  15.396 21.440 12.638 9.168 10.851 9.389 16% 
- of which Schemes under the Job 
Plan, etc.  
900 1.745 2.624 3.616 5.395 4.280 7% 
- of which other wage-earner and 
self-employed 
1.849 3.464 3.109 2.897 2.575 2.050 4% 
Study, etc. (B)  13.052 16.083 20.235 16.837 15.273 15.358 27% 
- of which education 5.043 6.031 7.358 6.145 5.751 5.756 10% 
- of which au pair 2.620 3.221 3.142 2.160 2.649 2.409 4% 
- of which interns 1.793 2.207 2.937 2.773 1.647 1.466 3% 
EU/EEA (C) 12.802 14.620 30.544 24.305 25.361 27.395 47% 
- of which wage-earner 3.684 4.532 17.837 11.019 10.560 11.673 20% 
- of which education 5.753 5.996 6.817 7.974 8.954 9.034 16% 
- of which to family members of an 
EU/EEA national 
1.941 2.980 4.773 3.824 3.492 3.537 6% 
Family reunification, etc.** (D) 4.198 5.148 4.407 5.211 5.410 3.396 6% 
Family reunification ** 3.582 4.454 3.749 4.479 4.768 2.902 5% 
of which spouses and cohabitants 2.787 3.616 3.071 3.662 3.869 2.163 4% 
Other residence cases 616 694 658 732 642 494 1% 
Asylum, etc. *** (E) 1.095 1.278 1.453 1.376 2.124 2.249 4% 
Refugee status *** 838 1.013 1.242 1.279 1.961 2.057 4% 
- of which Geneva Convention 201 70 311 414 797 957 2% 
- of which B-status/De facto-status 107 403 367 413 669 584 1% 
                                               
164 Justits Ministeriet. Statistical Overview. Migration and Asylum. 2012, p.3  
(http://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/0BF1EFD8-53EF-49F2-858A-
518A0F48ABB7/0/extract_statistical_overview_migration_asylum_2011.pdf) 
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*** 
- of which quota refugees 530 472 564 452 494 516 1% 
Other status 257 265 211 97 163 192 < 1% 
- of which humanitarian residence 
permits 
216 223 157 55 111 121 < 1% 
Total (A+B+C+D+E) 46.543 58.569 69.277 56.897 59.019 57.787 100% 
 
* Including 18 permits in the asylum area in 2010 and 2 permits for family reunification 
to Danish citizens according to the EU rules in 2010 registered incorrectly in the Aliens 
Register. It is not technically possible to remove these permits from the register. 
** Including permits for family reunification to Danish citizens according to the EU 
rules. 
*** Including 308 permits (B-status) to Iraqi interpreters etc. in 2007 and 83 in 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
